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Abstract
Bilateral incomplete-information negotiations of multiple issues present a diffi-
cult yet common negotiation problem that is complicated to solve from a mechanism
design perspective. Unlike multilateral situations, where the individual aspirations
of multiple agents can potentially be used against one another to achieve socially
desirable outcomes, bilateral negotiations only involve two agents; this makes the
negotiations appear to be a zero-sum game pitting agent against agent. While this
is essentially true, the gain of one agent is the loss of the other, with multiple issues,
it is not unusual that issues are valued asymmetrically such that agents can gain on
issues important to them but suffer losses on issues of less importance. Being able
to make trade-offs amongst the issues to take advantage of this asymmetry allows
both agents to experience overall benefit. The major complication is negotiating
under the uncertainty of incomplete information, where agents do not know each
other’s preferences and neither agent wants to be taken advantage of by revealing
its private information to the other agent, or by being too generous in its negotiat-
ing. This leaves agents stumbling in the dark trying to find appropriate trade-offs
amongst issues.
In this work, we introduce the Bilateral Automated Mediation (BAM) frame-
work. The BAM framework is aimed at helping agents alleviate the difficulties
of negotiating under uncertainty by formulating a negotiation environment that is
suitable for creating agreements that benefit both agents jointly. Our mediator
is a composition of many different negotiation ideas and methods put together in
a novel third-party framework that guides agents through the agreement space of
the negotiation, but instead of arbitrating a final agreement, it allows the agents
themselves to ratify the final agreement.
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Negotiations are a cornerstone of human interaction, ranging from everyday in-
terpersonal interaction to global interaction among nations. We are probably all
familiar with trying to decide which movie or restaurant to go to amongst a group
of friends, hearing about company mergers and takeovers, and at a larger scale,
the negotiation processes of conflicting groups in areas such as the Middle East or
the attempts of nations to come up with a global agreement for the reduction of
greenhouse-gas emission. It is easy to see then that negotiations are central to hu-
man society, and the resolution of conflict ranges from simplistic to the impossible.
To understand why negotiations can be difficult, it helps to understand why
negotiations exist at all. First of all, two or more parties realise that they can,
or must, work together to come up with some resolution over a number of issues.1
Parties negotiating an agreement on a set of issues have two major problems that
we are concerned with: (1) they do not know the preferences of the other parties,
and (2) the preferences of the parties are not aligned (in other words, they have
conflicting interests). Let us consider an example:
Two friends, S and B, need to decide on where to have dinner. S strongly
prefers any sort of Japanese food and really wants to try the restaurant
“Sushi Town”, but is willing to go to an Italian restaurant if that is the
only way an agreement can be made. B on the other hand, has no real
preferences except that, unknown to S, B does not want to go to the
restaurant “Sushi Town” because the last time he went there he was ill
afterwards.
1“Issue” is used in a very broad sense here, representing any parameters that could be negoti-
ated, tangible or intangible.
1
At the start of their decision process they both have a general idea of
what each other likes because they are friends and have been to dinner
together many times. S having a strong preference and knowing that B
is generally not very picky, suggests that they have Japanese food and
B agrees to that. B, wanting to avoid “Sushi Town”, takes preemptive
action in suggesting that they go to “Sushi Village”. However, since
S does not know about B’s previous illness and wants to try “Sushi
Town”, he makes a counter-offer by suggesting “Sushi Town”. B then
strongly objects mentioning his illness and says if they want Japanese
food it must be somewhere besides “Sushi Town”. S then agrees to go
to “Sushi Village” since he would rather have some Japanese food then
none at all.
What the example illustrates is a situation where the parties interests are not
completely incompatible, but they must negotiate in order to bring about a solution
that reasonably satisfies each of their private interests while still allowing them to
collaborate together. The negotiation process allows them a method to search
through the combined space of their preferences in order to find a solution to their
problem of finding a place to eat. An example with greater conflict of interests
could be made if B was averse to all Japanese food due to his illness. In this case,
the friends probably would have gone to an Italian restaurant but the negotiation
process may have lasted longer since S may continue to try to convince B to go to
a Japanese restaurant (maybe enumerating several different restaurants) since that
is what he strongly prefers.
In most real-world negotiations, we have a situation similar to the example; the
parties have a general idea of what the other party prefers but do not know exactly
what those preferences are, and at the same time there is some conflict between the
preferences of the parties. Consider a labour negotiation with only the single issue
of worker wages. The employer would prefer to pay as little as possible since that
means more profits and the workers want as high a wage as possible. Naturally,
both parties are aware of these preferences, but neither side knows the “breaking-
point” of the other, the wages that would be absolutely unacceptable to a party;
these points are known as the reservation prices of the parties. Not knowing the
preferences of the other party, is where the great difficulty lies since both parties
want to further their own interests but they do not want to be so greedy that a
deal cannot be made, but at the same time, want to get as much as they can from
the negotiation. Without knowing the preferences of the other party it is difficult
for either party to understand what is going to be too greedy or too selfless.
2
However, much of the research in negotiations occurs with what is known as
“complete information”. This means that all the parties know all the preferences
of the other parties. This is usually not very realistic, but makes the analysis of
negotiations a lot more manageable. In our work, we try to maintain a negotiation
environment that is realistic and that is why the concern of this work is bilateral,
multi-issue negotiations of incomplete information. “Bilateral” means that there
are two parties, as opposed to more than two (multi-lateral). “Multi-issue” is
self-explanatory meaning that there are multiple issues over which the two parties
negotiate. “Incomplete information” means that there is some information about
preferences that are private to the parties that hold those preferences; it may be
the case that a party knows some information about its counterpart, but it does
not know everything.
To ameliorate the problems of negotiation under uncertainty, we employ the use
of a third party. A third-party intervenor can operate as an unbiased shareholder
in the negotiation process, able to do things that neither party trusts the other
to do. Sometimes it takes an outside party to diffuse tense negotiations, make a
negotiation proceed smoothly, or achieve an efficient outcome that is superlative to
any that the parties themselves may produce. Our third-party framework will help
the negotiating parties to help themselves by guiding them through the negotiation
process, encouraging the production of results that are beneficial for both parties.
1.1 Our Philosophy
With as much conflict as there can be in some negotiation processes, negotiations
are still a collaborative venture [22]. We would like to see parties working together
to come up with a strong agreement for both of them instead of establishing an
adversarial environment of getting the better of each other. If each party is too
focused on what it can get out of the other, this can easily cause the breakdown of
the negotiation or result in an agreement that allows joint gains to go unrealised.
Our goal in introducing a third-party is to direct the negotiating parties’ atten-
tion towards building up agreements that are progressively better for both parties.
By guiding the parties to explore areas of the solution space that contain likely
candidates for joint gain, we hope to keep wasted opportunities to a minimum.
The viewpoint we take is that parties need to be actively searching for these joint
gains to get the full benefit from them.
3
1.2 Contributions
Our contribution in this work is two-fold: we create a novel third-party mediation
framework for bilateral incomplete information scenarios, as well as provide a nego-
tiation tool that can be used in real-life situations. The former contribution consists
of a general framework that other researchers can instantiate to fit their needs. The
latter contribution consists of a particular instantiation of the mediation framework
that can be used to assist in real negotiations.
As a mediation framework, our model encourages new views on how to approach
negotiation research. The framework embodies the idea of acting as a guide or
facilitator for the negotiating parties and not a dictator of a solution. It is difficult
to find quality solutions in incomplete information situations and our framework
acknowledges this by trying its best to set up a negotiation environment that will
be beneficial to the both parties, but ultimately re-involves them in the finalisation
process. It is this paradigm that we provide in a concrete framework for others to
explore and approach negotiation research from a different vantage point.
As a fully instantiated system, our model can be an aid in actual negotiations.
Being a mediator that can handle general negotiations, it is applicable to many
different situations. However, due to the generality of our scope and the complexity
of real-world negotiating, we suggest that our system be used as a tool and not as
a replacement for whatever current negotiation process parties may be using. As
a tool, our system can be a simulation that negotiating parties can use to get a
better grasp of how to analyse and understand their negotiation. The benefits of
such a simulator are numerous, some examples being:
• Helping parties better understand their actual preferences for the issues (par-
ties not being completely sure of their preferences can be a major problem in
negotiations).
• Giving early warning of where potential roadblocks may exist and allowing
exploration of possible solutions.
• Providing a starting agreement (the output of the simulation) that the parties
may criticise and refine.
Even just as an “ice-breaker” to push through the initial uncertainty of how to
negotiate is an important use of our system. Being a full simulation, our system can
give parties a tutorial in the analysis of their negotiation before they participate in
the real negotiation process.
4
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 2 Relates the necessary background material in negotiations and game
theory needed throughout the thesis.
Chapter 3 Discusses the related research that inspired our framework and con-
textually sets up other developments in later chapters.
Chapter 4 Describes how the use of negotiation tools can be used to manipulate
the negotiating parties’ attention in the solution space.
Chapter 5 Explores the heart of our work, the Bilateral Automated Mediator
framework, or BAM for short; the general framework is described as well as
our latest instantiation of it.
Chapter 6 Describes the simulation that implements our instantiation of the BAM
framework and some results from our experimentation.
Chapter 7 Examines possible extensions of different areas of our framework that
could be explored in the future.
Chapter 8 Is the conclusion of the body of the thesis and reviews the highlights
of the framework and our work.
Appendix A Goes into detail about some of the computational aspects of our use
of agendas, giving an idea of how much work our system actually needs to





This chapter outlines the preliminary knowledge that will be useful in later chapters.
In Section 2.1, we introduce the idea of agents and multi-agent systems, then in
Section 2.2, preferences of agents are discussed using utility theory, then Section 2.3
explores necessary ideas we will draw on from game theory and mechanism design,
and the final section, Section 2.4, examines the necessary background knowledge
we will need from the field of negotiations.
2.1 Multi-agent Systems (MASs)
From this point forward, when we discuss the parties of a negotiation, we will refer
to them as agents. At its most basic, an agent is an entity that can perceive the
world it is situated in and perform actions within that world [25]. This definition
can encompass humans as agents, but also allows for agents to be artificially created
entities, which will often be the case in electronic settings.1 In the field of Computer
Science, one often has the need to make representations of ideas, artifacts, and
actors from the real world; agents can be thought of as the representation of the
actors within a given setting.
When we need to consider the creation of agents and how they should act, we
enter into the realm of Artificial Intelligence. With respect to agent design, artificial
intelligence studies how to determine the details of implementing the behaviour of
agents. It is not unusual that this behaviour be informed by the preferences of a
user that is employing the agent as its representative to act on the user’s behalf
1In our work, we allow that agents might be human or electronic.
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in some electronic setting. Being able to choose actions that best implement the
desired behaviour of an agent’s creator is a property of rational agents. A rational
agent is one that chooses the best actions to implement its goals based on the
information it has. When having to deal with situations involving uncertainty, a
rational agent should choose actions that maximise its expected benefit (however
this benefit may be measured) [25].
As we move into a setting where an agent is interacting with other agents and
not just an unintelligent environment, we begin to discuss Multi-agent Systems
(MASs). A MAS is just that, a system consisting of multiple agents that need to
interact with each other to satisfy their personal or collective goals. In our work, we
are mainly interested in MASs where the agents are self-interested, meaning each
agent is trying to satisfy its personal goals but is not concerned with whether or
not other agents are satisfying their goals (unless that is a part of an agent’s goals).
Being self-interested does not mean that an agent acts with malice towards other
agents, but it is a form of selfishness such that an agent is only concerned with
its own goals; the presence of other agents only becomes a consideration insofar
as those agents can help or hinder an agent’s personal goals. Game Theory and
Mechanism Design (Section 2.3) are fields of research often employed in artificial
intelligence when agents have to start considering strategic interaction with other
agents [25]. Negotiation is an essential part of the strategic interaction within a
MAS [3].
2.1.1 MASs and Negotiation
Negotiation is one of the most important and critical interaction methods for multi-
agent systems [10]. It has been well-studied and a few of the major areas of research
have been: collective decision-making and consensus building, automation of nego-
tiations, strategies for agent behaviour, and the role and consequences of different
negotiation processes.
One focus in MAS negotiations centres around agents trying to influence other
agents in order to come to a mutually acceptable agreement; this was particularly
prevalent with respect to argumentation as negotiation [14, 10, 15]. In the earlier
years of the research focused on consensus building, game theory was already be-
coming an important tool for negotiation research [4, 10]. There was also, and still
is, a lot of focus on the strategies of agents within different negotiation settings
[5, 6, 17], hence placing a greater focus on the self-interested aspect of agents.
Our work does not feature consensus building; that is an area of research typified
by multilateral (more than two agent) societal settings and considerations. Our
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research focuses much more on negotiation instances between two agents, although
these smaller individual interactions could be drawing agents from a multilateral
society of agents. Our work is also not concerned with the strategies of agents.
Instead, we are focused on the manipulation of negotiation processes to create
desirable results (based on whatever arbitrary goals we may have) and on a form
of negotiation automation.
We introduce a third-party into the negotiations that guides agents by devel-
oping a negotiation process that tries to help the agents achieve jointly beneficial
agreements. Whereas much of the negotiation process research is concerned with
looking at specific environments determining what the optimal behaviours will be
[5], we keep our basic environment very general. However, based on the input we
receive from each particular negotiation scenario, we create negotiation parame-
ters that effectively change the environment for the agents. With our work, the
negotiation environment changes a little bit between each separate negotiation.
The procedure of changing the negotiation environment is encapsulated within
an automated mediator. Our automation differs from the automation research
because we are automating our third-party to construct a negotiation procedure for
the agents. In contrast, much existing automation research refers to automation as
choosing correct protocols for agents using particular strategies or choosing agent
strategies for particular negotiation protocols [5, 10, 6]. Although our automated
third-party does, essentially, choose protocols and parameters for the agents to use,
we introduce new types of protocols and ways of constructing them. Our protocols
draw on novel ideas introduced in this work, but are also influenced by existing
tools in negotiations research and existing ideas and theories from game theory
and mechanism design (Section 2.3) that are already widely used in negotiation
research.
2.2 Preferences, Utility, and Uncertainty
Agents will have preferences over different situations, and in order to quantify these
preferences we use the idea of utility. Agents receive a certain amount of utility,
that is based on their preferences, for outcomes or states in negotiations. Utility is
a way to measure the value of an outcome for an agent; a higher utility agreement
is more valued than a lower utility agreement.
Notation 1 (Utility) The utility for an agent, a, for a particular state or out-
come in the world, S, will be denoted ua(S). Abusing notation, we will refer to
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anything that renders utility to an agent by ua(i), where i can be anything that
renders utility, possibly indirectly (this could be something like taking a particular
action that leads to a state that actually renders utility).
Self-interested agents will want to maximise their utility by behaving in a man-
ner that yields the highest utility outcomes or states in the world. In our negotiation
setting, this means making offers that lead to the highest utility agreements possi-
ble. But what do agents do in the face of uncertainty (for example, if some element
of chance exists that affects the outcome of a situation)? In this case, the ratio-
nal agent should try to maximise its expected utility given the probabilities of the
possible outcomes and the utility valuation the agent has for those outcomes. The
expected utility is naturally calculated as follows:
Definition 1 (Expected Utility) For an agent a ∈ A(the set of all agents), a
set of outcomes O, and a probability distribution over the outcomes P , the expected




We will frequently represent the utility of agents geometrically:
Definition 2 (Utility Space) For n agents, a utility space is an n-dimensional
space that consists of an n-dimensional point for each possible outcome, where each
agent’s utility is expressed along a different axis.
As we are dealing with bilateral negotiations (two agents), our utility space will
only be two dimensional, and in our particular case, is always convex.2 A convex
space is one where if you take any two points in the space, all the points between
those two points are also in the space. We will generally only concern ourselves
with utility spaces along the positive portions of the axes. See Figure 2.1 for some
examples of both concave and non-concave utility spaces.
Of particular interest in a utility space is the boundary of the space, as this
forms a frontier of efficiency.
2Having a convex utility space is useful because it means there are many troublesome situations










Figure 2.1: (a) A very simple convex utility space. (b) A slightly more complex convex
utility space. (c) A non-convex utility space.
Definition 3 (Efficient Frontier) The efficient frontier[22] consists of all the
points in a utility space that have the following property: the point cannot be altered
such that one agent receives a greater amount of utility (than in the original point),
without another agent receiving less utility (than in the original point) while still
being inside the utility space.
Figure 2.2 highlights the efficient frontiers of the utility spaces introduced in
Figure 2.1.
2.3 Mechanism Design and Game Theory
Mechanism design is a field in game theory that concerns itself with designing games
that result in outcomes possessing desirable properties despite the existence of the
self-interested agents playing the games. By designing the rules and protocols of
a game correctly, the resulting mechanism produces a strategic situation where it
is in the best interests of the agents to behave in a manner that results in a type
of outcome desired by the mechanism designer. Mechanism design is often referred
to as “inverse game theory” since game theory more traditionally has been about
the study of the strategic aspects and properties of existing games and how to play
them, whereas mechanism design works inversely creating new games with the aim











Figure 2.2: The same utility spaces as in Figure 2.1 with their efficient frontiers
highlighted in bold. We see that in (c) the efficient frontier does not consist of the
entire space boundary since all the points between p1 and p2 (including p1) can be
replaced with point p2 to give agent s a higher utility without reducing the utility of
agent b. However, all the spaces we will deal with will be convex and so the efficient
frontiers will be connected like in (a) and (b).
In this work, we will be acting as a designer of a negotiation mechanism that
guarantees certain properties and attempts to achieve other desirable properties.
The game theoretic properties of importance to us are outlined in the following
section.
2.3.1 Important Game-Theoretic Properties
Individual Rationality (IR)
Individual rationality (IR) is a property portrayed by a mechanism if an agent
participating in the mechanism is no worse off for participating. In terms of utility,
this can be phrased as an agent participating in an individually rational mechanism
will receive non-negative utility from the experience. This is a desirable property
because agents, given the choice, are more likely to participate in an individually
rational mechanism.
(Individual Rationality) A mechanism, M, is individually rational if for every
agent a ∈ A, the utility of the agent is non-negative. ua ≥ 0, ∀a∈A
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There are three different types of IR that relate to the strength of the IR prop-
erty with respect to time and knowledge: ex-ante, ex-interim, and ex-post. Ex-ante
IR means that the expected utility for participating in the mechanism is greater
than the utility for not participating, for each agent, when the agents have no in-
formation about their own preferences yet. Ex-interim IR is basically the same as
ex-ante IR, except agents know their own preferences, but not the preferences of
others. Ex-post IR means that the agents are guaranteed a better utility by partic-
ipating in the mechanism than opting out, no matter what the personal preferences
of the agents are.
Incentive Compatibility (IC)
Incentive Compatibility (IC) is a property portrayed by a mechanism if agents par-
ticipating in the mechanism have no incentive to be dishonest when asked to reveal
private information to the mechanism. For example, if an agent is participating in
an incentive compatible auction, then the agent will bid with its true reservation
price rather than basing its bid on other agents’ bids and on its personal beliefs
about the other agents reservation prices. In terms of utility, incentive compati-
bility means that an agent’s utility for declaring its private information honestly
to the mechanism is never worse than making a dishonest declaration. This is a
desirable property because it means that agents do not have to waste their time
trying to figure out the best declaration strategy and the mechanism designer can
trust the declarations it receives and actually make use of them.
(Incentive Compatibility) Given a mechanism, M, that requires agents to de-
clare some private information, let each agent a ∈ A have private information
Ia ∈ I, and let the utility the agent receives for declaring i be denoted ua(i).
Then, M is incentive compatible if the utility each agent receives for declar-
ing Ia is at least as good as the utility for declaring any i ∈ I where i 6= Ia.
∀a∀i 6=Iai ua(Ia) ≥ ua(i)
We will also use a weaker form of IC called one-sided incentive compatibility [27].
Intuitively, one-sided IC means that an agent has no incentive to lie about their
private information in a manner that would make it seem stronger, but it might
still have incentives to declare information that makes its position seem weaker.
(One-sided Incentive Compatibility) Given a mechanism, M, that requires
agents to declare some private information, let each agent a ∈ A have pri-
vate information Ia ∈ I, and let the utility the agent receives for declaring
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i be denoted ua(i). Let Istronger ⊆ I be the set of private information that
would appear to make agent a’s position stronger than Ia, and let Iweaker ⊆ I
be the set of private information that would appear to make agent a’s posi-
tion weaker than Ia. Then, M is one-sided incentive compatible if the util-
ity each agent receives for declaring any value in {Ia} ∪ Iweaker is greater
than or equal to the maximum utility of declaring any value in Istronger.
∀a∀i ∈ ({Ia} ∪ Iweaker) ua(i) ≥ maxj∈Istronger(ua(j))
One might note that one-sided IC causes declarations that may have once pro-
duced a stronger position to now produce a weaker position. One-sided IC might
also be considered as a psychological property as illustrated by first-price sealed bid
auctions. In such an auction, bidders reveal their bids all at the same time and the
highest bid gets the item and pays the highest bid amount. A bidder may appear
to have a stronger bid position if it lies and bids higher than the item is actually
worth to it; in this way, the bidder is more likely to get the item. However, if the
bidder bids higher than its actual valuation and wins the item, it actually receives
negative utility. In fact, if the bidder bids below its actual valuation, then it may
still win the item and receive positive utility, even though it is declaring a “weaker”
position.
Pareto Optimality
Pareto optimality is a property of a solution or outcome that says no agent can in-
crease its utility over that of the solution without causing some other agent’s utility
to decrease. A mechanism is said to be pareto optimal if the outcomes/solutions
it produces have this property. Note that the efficient frontier in a utility space is
exactly the points in the space that are pareto optimal solutions (see Figure 2.2).
The value of a pareto optimal solution is that it acts as a measure of efficiency;
if a solution is pareto optimal, then the solution is on the efficient frontier of the
solution space. In other words, there are no further joint gains that can be had
over a pareto solution; no amount of utility is going to waste.
2.3.2 Myerson-Satterthwaite Bilateral Trading Theorem
The Bilateral Trading Problem
The bilateral trading situation is where one agent has an item to sell to another
agent, but the two agents do not know whether their respective reservation prices
14
are compatible for an exchange to occur. More formally, we have two agents, the
seller(s) and the buyer(b), and each agent has a reservation price (RP) for the
item. The seller’s RP, ps is drawn from an interval [sL, sH ] and the buyer’s RP, pb,
is drawn from an interval [bL, bH ], each according to some probability distribution
that fully supports each interval. In addition, there is a non-empty intersection
between these intervals (i.e. bL < sH), which means it is possible for ps > pb.
Agent s is not willing to sell the item for less than ps and agent b is not willing to
pay more than pb. If ps ≤ pb, then an exchange should occur with the buyer paying
the seller some price p, where ps ≤ p ≤ pb. If ps > pb then an exchange should not
occur.
The bilateral trading problem is the challenge of coming up with a mechanism
that receives (possibly untruthful) declarations of reservation prices from the agents,
and then decides whether or not a trade occurs and, if a trade occurs, at what the
price the trade occurs. A useful mechanism for this problem should make sure that
a trade occurs if ps ≤ pb, and no trade occurs otherwise. If this is upheld, then no
agent ever receives negative utility and the item is always exchanged when it should
be. The heart of the problem is that the declarations from the agents cannot be
trusted and the only other information available about the reservation prices are
the intervals they were drawn from, but these intervals overlap and so we cannot
know for certain whether ps ≤ pb. To summarise, we cannot determine whether
a trade should occur because we cannot determine the reservation prices from the
intervals they are drawn from, nor can we determine them from the declarations
of the agents. But can we design an incentive compatible mechanism where the
agents declare their true reservation prices and make the mechanism designer’s life
easier? The following theorem from Myerson and Satterthwaite [19] responds in
the negative.
Theorem 1 (Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem) For the bilateral trading problem,
no mechanism can be incentive-compatible, individually rational, and ex-post effi-
cient.3
This basically says that for the bilateral trading problem, we cannot get the
following three properties to occur at the same time no matter what mechanism we
use:
1. (incentive-compatible) Agents will declare their true reservation prices to the
mechanism.
3For a formal proof of this theorem, please see [19].
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2. (individually rational) Agents receive non-negative utility from the outcome
of the mechanism.
3. (ex-post efficient) If the actual reservation price of the seller is less than the
actual reservation price of the buyer, then a trade will occur, otherwise no
trade occurs.4
This theorem is actually even more negative than it sounds, because it still holds
when trying to work in expectation, which is a weaker setting. This theorem helps
illustrate why negotiations are not nicely solvable when private information exists
(which is almost always the case in real negotiation settings). Private information
can create situations of uncertainty where no agent knows whether working together
is a good thing for all agents, and no third party can extract this information from
the agents truthfully.
In our work, we will be dealing with similar problems of incomplete information,
except we will be dealing with multiple issues instead of just a single issue.
2.4 Negotiation
2.4.1 Third Parties: Mediation and Arbitration
A third party may engage in a negotiation in several ways: acting as a facilitator
that brings parties together to negotiate, diffusing tensions by acting as an calming
influence and messenger between the parties, suggesting useful procedures/ideas
for the negotiation process5, suggesting possible agreements, or even dictating an
agreement. The actions open to a third party depend on how much power it has
been imbued with.
A mediator can perform many of the functions listed, but cannot dictate an
agreement as it does not have the power to enforce such an agreement. A mediator
can suggest agreements it thinks are useful, but the agents are not required to accept
such an agreement. The usefulness of a mediator comes from it being an unbiased
4This is a similar idea to pareto optimality/efficiency, but in the bilateral trading setting.
However, technically any trade made in this setting is pareto optimal since one agent cannot
receive more utility without the other receiving less, that is why we have the ex-post efficiency
criteria instead.
5A relevant example is that a third-party might suggest playing some sort of negotiation game
that helps the parties better understand their own personal preferences in the negotiation. They
might even suggest using our system as a first step towards achieving a successful negotiation!
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party in the negotiations which may give it the ability to see viable solutions or
profitable areas of negotiation that a biased party might not realise is beneficial.
Perhaps more importantly, the mediator has the credibility as a third party to
suggest such solutions and have them seriously considered.
On the other hand, an arbitrator can usually do everything a mediator can
with the addition of having the power to dictatorially enforce an agreement of
its choosing, if it wishes to do so. The difference in enforcement powers can be
illustrated by the following two institutions: a commission or tribunal that creates
a report of recommendations on some situation that does not have to be followed
(mediator) versus a judge that hands down a decision in a legal case (arbitrator).
Traditional mechanisms have the flavour of being an arbitrator: they tend to
gather information from agents and then implement an outcome that agents must
abide by. In our work we will act more as a mediator, and although we will be cre-
ating a negotiation mechanism that decides on many parameters of the negotiation,
we will involve the agents in creating the final implemented agreement.
2.4.2 Single Negotiating Texts (SNTs)
A single negotiating text (SNT) is an agreement that allows all parties to focus on
the same (intermediary) solution instead of focusing on their individual partisan
offers [22]. Without this negotiation device, agents will typically propose inde-
pendently developed solutions that will be widely disparate from the other agent’s
proposals. This leads to adversarial posturing where each side must start with an
extravagant offer, as to not appear too weak, and then must come down towards
a more reasonable position (which is probably closer to their actual position than
what they first proposed). This type of politicised atmosphere puts too much em-
phasis on out-positioning an “opponent” and loses sight of the collaborative gains
that can still be achieved. For example, consider Figure 2.3 (a), which illustrates
a typical negotiation process against the backdrop of the utility space. Here the
agents initially propose agreements ob and os, which are nowhere near each other.
The most likely sequence of future offers will lead the two agents into the middle-
ground of these two offers, the area A. However, even though the middle ground is
more fair to all involved, there is still a whole area of joint gain that could still be
achieved over any offer in A. This area, labeled W, is essentially wasted utility for
both agents.
Using an SNT approach, the agents instead focus on a single agreement to build
upon, only accepting a new SNT that all parties agree is better than the current
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agreement; this process continues iteratively until a final agreement is reached.
The psychological shift in this approach is that now agents focus their attention
and criticisms on the current SNT (that both agents came up with) as opposed
to attaching criticism to the other agent’s offer and the other agent itself. This
incremental approach to the negotiation forces agents to think about how to improve
the current agreement such that both parties can agree upon the new SNT; agents
can no longer think in a purely egocentric way, producing offers that will just
be rejected, but must focus themselves more realistically on mutually beneficial
increments. The real shift in attention for the agents is that in order to increase
their own utility, they must also focus on how the other agent can increase its utility















Figure 2.3: Illustration of the differences between negotiating with and without an
SNT approach. (a) Without using an SNT, instead using an approach where agents
take turns making offers. Offers tend to gravitate to somewhere in the middle ground
(area labeled ’A’) of the original offers until some agreement is reached. (b) Using an
SNT. Agents proceed from the no agreement point (the origin) towards the efficient
frontier, incrementally building upon previous agreements.
Looking at Figure 2.3 helps illustrate the approach of the typical negotiation
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process (Figure 2.3 (a)) versus that of an incremental SNT approach (Figure 2.3
(b)). Without using the SNT approach, offers from the two agents gravitate towards
each other, moving somewhat parallel to the efficient frontier; there is little or no
focus in regards to moving the agreement towards the efficient frontier, as most
of the effort is spent on bridging the gap between the agents’ initial offers. One
benefit of this approach is that the ratified agreement is generally fair in the sense
that it is a compromise between the two agents’ initial offers.6 The incremental
SNT approach, on the other hand, starts from an unsatisfactory agreement but
continually moves towards the efficient frontier, the focus always being ”how can
we squeeze more utility out of this agreement?”. This approach also renders fair
agreements since the intermediary agreements must continually satisfy both agents,
but by moving orthogonally to the efficient frontier, it is more likely that the wasted
utility space will be reduced.
2.4.3 Agendas
With regards to a multi-issue negotiation, a negotiating agenda is a schedule that
specifies the order in which issues will be negotiated. Such a schedule specifies not
only the order of issues, but separates issues into stages such that all the issues in
one stage are negotiated before the issues in the succeeding stage in the schedule.
Agendas allow negotiations to be broken down into more easily digestible stages (see
Figure 2.4), but can also be used as a tool to manipulate negotiations depending
on which issues are in which stages.
Much of the agenda research has only allowed the negotiation of a stage to
consist purely of the issues in that stage, meaning that you are only negotiating
the utility of that single stage. This means that we are throwing away utility at
each stage if an efficient agreement is not made in the stage. The agendas that
we will use in our work will allow for renegotiation of previous stages, which is
based on the work of John and Raith [11, 12]. This means that at any given stage,
the negotiation process covers the issues in the current stage as well as all issues
in previous stages, the only caveat being that any prices already agreed upon for
issues in previous stages now compose the default agreement for the current stage.7
By allowing renegotiation of issues in previous stages, it is possible to recover utility
6However, this means that an agent must be very careful about how it chooses its initial offer,
which can be very difficult.
7For example, if the agents have agreed that issue 5 in the last stage should have a price or
value of 22, then if they do not renegotiate issue 5 in the current stage the agreement price will
still be 22. However, if both agents agree to a renegotiated price for issue 5, then this new price







Figure 2.4: An agenda causes the utility space to be divided among its stages so that
parts of the utility space are negotiated in each stage.
that would have just been wasted in a non-renegotiating agenda. Figure 2.5 helps
explain the differences.
2.4.4 Solution Concepts
A solution concept [13] for a negotiation is essentially an agreement that has cer-
tain properties or comes about through the rational constraints that arise through
analysis of a particular negotiation procedure. The first type of solution concept
is called axiomatic, because the solution is derived from a set of axioms that must
be satisfied. Most axiomatic solutions of interest define a unique solution and we
consider the two most popular axiomatic solutions: the Nash bargaining solution
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. The second type of solution con-
cept arises from the strategic analysis of a negotiation model or procedure. We will
consider the Rubinstein-St̊ahl alternating offers model and its analysis below.
In our work, we will make use of both an axiomatic approach as well as a
more procedural approach. The axiomatic approach we use is the Nash bargaining
solution, however, it is entirely possible to substitute another solution concept into
our model as fits the needs or requirements of the particular negotiation situation.
We use a similar analysis to the Rubinstein-St̊ahl alternating offers model in order








Figure 2.5: Showing the difference between agendas that do not allow renegotiation
and those that do, in terms of the utility space. (a) Without renegotiation, when the
stage one agreement is made, in stage two we can only negotiate the utility strictly
represented by stage two (the shaded portion of the space). (b) With renegotiation,
we can renegotiate the same space as in (a) but we are still open to renegotiating the
utility that went to “waste” in the stage one agreement. This gives agents a chance to
still have an overall efficient agreement.
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Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)8 is probably the most well known axiomatic
bargaining solution, and it stems from the following four axioms that the solution
must satisify:
1. Pareto Optimality/Efficiency - The solution must not be improvable for
one agent without harming another agent. This was already discussed in
Section 2.3.1 on page 14.
2. Symmetry - The solution does not depend on the identities of the agents.
If we switched the agents identities but kept all the utility information the
same, then the solution should still be the same.
3. Invariance to Affine Transformations - If we already have a solution
and then the utility information undergoes an affine transformation, the new
solution for this new scenario is the same as the old solution having undergone
the same affine transformation.
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) - If we have a utility
space U, and the solution for this space is s ∈ U , then if we restrict our space
to some subspace V ⊂ U where s ∈ V , the solution for the utility space V
should still be s.
The NBS is actually the only solution that satisfies these four properties [13].
But what do the properties mean? Pareto optimality should be fairly clear by now:
it is an efficiency criteria. Symmetry just means that the solution is not biased by
the identities of the agents, whoever the agents may be, whether they are powerful
or weak entities, the solution remains the same.
The invariance of affine transformations needs a little bit of explaining. Consider





utility space on the right is just the space on the left where the y-axis utilities are
multiplied by 3 and the x-axis utilities by 2. According to the invariance of affine





the old solution having undergone the affine transformation the utility space has
undergone. This axiom is useful because it means that our solution does not depend
on the agent’s valuations of their own utilities, which can be operating on vastly
different scales from agent to agent. For example, say that one agent is measuring
8First introduced by Nash in [20].
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its utility in the range 0 to 10 and the other agent is measuring its utility in the
range 0 to 1000. If we wanted to maximise the overall utility, we would be biased
towards the latter agent, however the utility ranges of the agents are not, and should
not, be comparable because these ranges are just abstract personal measurements
of some measure of satisfaction or usefulness. If the first agent all of sudden decides
to use a range from 50 to 100, has anything about the situation really changed?
Not really, and neither should our solution, it should be based on other properties







Solution = ( x/2, y/2 ) Solution = ( x, 3(y/2) )
Figure 2.6: Example of invariance of affine transformations. If for the utility space




) then when we move to the utility space on the right
by the affine transformation that multiplies all utilities along the x-axis by 2 and the






The last property, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), is the most
controversial of the properties. To understand why, let us first give some examples
of this property. Figure 2.7 shows two examples of IIA stemming from the same
original space, U. In both of the derived subspaces, V ⊂ U and W ⊂ U , the original
solution s still exists. The IIA property then says that if s is the solution of the
larger space U , then it should still be the solution in the smaller spaces V and
W . The rationale is that s is originally the best solution, so why should removing
solutions that were not considered before alter what is considered the best solution
in the smaller spaces?
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Raiffa [22] gives a very good example, that we paraphrase here:
You go into a restaurant and peruse the menu, choosing the entree,
braised beef. After making your decision, you notice several entrees
have stars next to their names and you enquire as to why. The waiter
tells you that those entrees are not available today. Your already chosen
entree, braised beef, is not among these starred choices, so it is still
available. Your choice of entree should still be the braised beef, should
it not? After all, that was what you considered the best option from
the full menu, shouldn’t it be the best option for you on the restricted
menu?
The story just mentioned makes it seem that IIA is a very reasonable axiom
after all, so what is the criticism of IIA? The problem lies in the fact that the story
just mentioned only considers a single agent’s options, but a negotiation involves
multiple agents. In Figure 2.7, the solution s in the space V gives the vertical axis
agent its maximum utility, but only gives the horizontal axis agent about two-thirds
of its utility. This seems more fair in the full space U , where each agent is getting
a share of their maximum utility, but seems unfair in the space V . Why should one
agent get its maximum utility while the other agent does not? This is the main
criticism of the Nash solution and is addressed by the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
detailed in Section 2.4.4.
The question then becomes, why do we use the NBS in our system? The main
answer is that the sorts of utility spaces that allow for this criticism do not really
appear in our system. However, we could just as easily use the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution if we desire; one useful aspect of our system is that its functioning does
not depend on the solution concept used. So the most appropriate solution concept
for a particular negotiation scenario should be the one used, whether it is the NBS,
the KSBS(Kalai-Smorodinsky), or some other solution concept. We just choose the
NBS because it is the most well-known solution, has reasonable properties, and is
easy to calculate.
We have just alluded to the fact that the NBS is easy to calculate, so how is
it calculated? It would seem it might be complicated to satisfy all four of those
axioms, but it turns out that the unique solution that satisfies those axioms is
simply the solution that maximises the product of the agents’ utilities [13]. Since
the solution is known to be Pareto-optimal, all we have to do is find the point on








Figure 2.7: Example of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom.
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Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (KSBS)
The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (KSBS) is one of the most used alter-
natives to the NBS. The KSBS is another axiomatic solution that uses all the same
axioms as the NBS except that the IIA axiom is replaced with a monotonicity con-
dition. The monotonicity condition is a bit lengthy to explain and is unnecessary
for our consideration (for the specific details see [13]).
The important aspect of the KSBS is that it is the solution that gives each
agent the same percentage of its maximum utility. The percentage changes based
on the shape of the efficient frontier, but is the same for each agent in a given
solution. This seems very fair because each agent realises the same proportion of
their maximum utility.
Figure 2.8 (a) illustrates how to calculate the the KSBS. First, an ideal point is
defined, u∗ which is the point where each agent receives its maximum utility. A line
is drawn between u∗ and the disagreement point (in most of our cases, the origin),
and where this line intersects the efficient frontier is the KSBS solution. Figure 2.8
(b) shows where the KSBS solutions would be in the restricted spaces V and W ,
at sv and sw respectively, which can be contrasted with the NBS solution snbs that
does not change from V to W .
Rubinstein / St̊ahl Alternating Offers Model
The Rubinstein/St̊ahl alternating offers model [24, 26] is a widely used negotiation
procedure used in the literature. Its essential feature is that it gives one agent the
opportunity to propose an agreement, and if that proposal is rejected by the other
agent, then the other agent now gets to propose an agreement. This continues until
an agreement is reached or some time limit expires or a discount factor eventually
makes the negotiation worthless.
This model typically consists of dividing some item, usually a pie. The size of
the pie starts at 1, but as time goes by the pie “shrinks”: for each rejected proposal,
the pie shrinks by a factor δ < 1. At the beginning of the game the pie is of size
1, after one rejection, it is size δ, after two rejections it is size δ2, and so on. If the
current size of the pie is π9, then when an agent proposes an offer, it offers x ≤ π
to the other agent with (π − x) left for itself.
To determine what an agent should offer in the first round, we use backwards
















Figure 2.8: (a) An example of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution compared to the Nash
Bargaining solution. (b) Examples of how the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution changes as
the utility space changes. The dotted lines of the old frontier show the area that has
been removed from the utility space to give spaces V and W , and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solutions are sV and sW , respectively.
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two values: the least amount that the other agent can expect in the next proposal
round and the most that the other agent can expect in the next proposal round.
The benefit that the proposer gets is that it gets an extra share due to the amount
of the pie that would be discounted between this round and the next round, since
the other agent cannot reasonably expect to get this portion in the next round
(since it will have “shrunk” away by then). The backwards induction we outline
next is from Gintis [9].
We assume that both agents are rational agents trying to maximise their per-
sonal utilities (or portions of the pie). Let the first proposer be agent 1, the second
proposer agent 2, and let z be the most that agent 1 can get in this game (the most
agent 1 can get given that both agents are playing rationally). If this is the most
agent 1 can get in the game, then this amount must be what agent 1 can get in
the first round because its aspirations decrease as time goes by due to the discount
factor and the fact that the later rounds are exactly the same as the earlier rounds
except that the pie is smaller (meaning there is no strategic difference). The second
time agent 1 gets to propose, the most it can get is δ2z, therefore the most that
agent 2 must offer, in its first chance to propose, to player 1 is this amount δ2z.10
This means that agent 2’s share of the pie would be at least δ − δ2z, and therefore
going back to the first round, agent 1 must give agent 2 at least δ − δ2z. Finally,
this means that agent 1’s share from the first round proposal is 1− δ + δ2z, but this
must equal z because agent 1 is offering agent 2 the least amount required and thus
must be getting the most it can possibly get from a first round proposal, namely z.







Now let a be the least agent 1 can possibly get in this game, then on agent 1’s
second turn to make an offer the least it can get is δ2a. On player 2’s first turn to
offer, the least that needs to be offered to agent 1 is this amount δ2a, and the most
player 2 gets is δ− δ2a. Therefore in the first round, the most agent 1 must offer is
10Because then agent 1 is indifferent between accepting agent 2’s proposal and going to the
next proposal round. Technically, because δ2z is the most agent 1 can get in the next round, it
may actually prefer accepting this proposal than going to the next round.
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δ− δ2a, leaving itself 1− δ + δ2a, which must equal a since now agent 1 is receiving
the least it possibly could. And we get the following:







Therefore, a = z, the least agent 1 can get is the same as the most it can get














In this chapter we first discuss the philosophical influence of a major work in nego-
tiations (Section 3.1), then move on to the use of arbitrators and mediators in game
theory (Section 3.2), and finally, delve into research related to the use of agendas
and incremental negotiation (Section 3.3).
3.1 The Art and Science of Negotiation
Published in 1982, The Art and Science of Negotiation by Howard Raiffa [22] is
one of the most well-known books in the field of negotiation. Its compilation and
exploration of every aspect of negotiations is both informative and inspiring to
naive negotiators and seasoned professionals alike.
Raiffa had a particular bias towards being unbiased, considering the viewpoints
of all parties and implicitly encouraging others to do the same in this book. Parties
are involved in a negotiation because, for one reason or another, they all benefit
from mutual participation and collaboration. Raiffa focused on this spirit of “we are
all in this together”, promoting exploration of joint gains over individual selfishness.
When individual selfishness is the mindset of agents, an adversarial environment
arises, often leading to inefficient agreements that “leave something on the table”
that all parties could have jointly benefitted from, but none will (see for example,
the space labelled W in Figure 2.3).
The original inspiration for this entire thesis is the idea of this lost utility going
to waste and finding a way to recover it. The result of this influence can be seen
in our framework’s guiding principle: direct agents to explore areas of the solution
space that provide joint benefit.
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3.2 Arbitration and Mediation in Game Theory
3.2.1 Arbitrators in Games
Arbitrators need to look at situations, acquire information, and determine an out-
come or solution based upon this acquired knowledge combined with its principles
for a good solution. When an arbitrator does not have the ability to gather infor-
mation independently (as is often the case in game theoretic settings), it must rely
on the agents for its data. Rosenthal [23] explains that if an arbitrator needs to ask
for information, then the agents have incentives to lie if they can predict how their
declaration may affect the arbitrator’s solution. In bargaining, it is a difficult prob-
lem to get agents to tell the truth and maintain efficiency and individual-rationality
as we saw with the work of Myerson and Satterthwaite [19] in Section 2.3.2. Pratt
and Zeckhauser [21] studied the multi-issue setting and put it succinctly:
There is no costless way out of the incentive compatibility problem.
Both of these groups of authors showed that if you want the truth you have to
pay for it; you have to give the agents incentive to tell the truth. This problem
of incentive compatibility is why our third-party framework does not act as an
arbitrator. While our framework does have flavours of arbitration, we do not want
to dictate a solution coming from “poisoned” data. As a third-party intervenor, we
cannot avoid relying on such data, but we avoid dictating a final agreement from
it, instead facilitating an agreement as a mediator.
3.2.2 Mediators in Games
Before discussing existing mediators in games, it will be instructive to use a running
example, for which we use the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game shown in
normal-form in Figure 3.1.
In this game, if both agents choose to cooperate then they each receive 4 utility
units, if both defect they each receive 1 utility unit, and if they choose opposite
strategies, the defector gets 6 and the cooperator 0 utility units. In this situation,
game theory tells us that rational agents will both defect, which is an inefficient
solution but guarantees each agent that they will not get 0 utility units. If only
agents could trust each other enough to cooperate, they could both better their










Figure 3.1: The classic prisoner’s dilemma game.
One of the earliest forms of mediation in games can be found in Aumann’s
correlated equilibria [1], the essential idea of which is that each agent observes
a public signal and chooses its action based on the outcome of that signal. For
example, if a coin were flipped and an agent decided to cooperate if heads came up
and defect if tails came up. An actual correlated equilibrium occurs if the strategies
assigned to each signal are such that neither agent would want to deviate from its
strategy. Unfortunately for the prisoner’s dilemma, the only correlated equilibrium
is to defect on every signal. One should observe that a correlated equilibrium
requires agents to not deviate, although in theory they should not want to.
Monderer and Tennenholtz [18] take the idea of mediators even further. In a
game like the prisoner’s dilemma, they create a new game on top of the old game
where a mediator action is now available. Agents have the option of choosing to
defect, cooperate, or to let the mediator play for them. If an agent lets the mediator
play on its behalf, the mediator behaves as follows: cooperate if the other agent
also chooses the mediator and defect otherwise. The new game becomes the 3x3
normal-form game shown in Figure 3.2.
This mediator has given agents the best of both worlds! However, this type of
mediator has added something to the original game that did not exist before, the
ability of a party to act after a decision has been announced by an agent. That is,
the mediator decides how it will play after the agents have announced their choice
about using the mediator or not.
The types of mediators mentioned are layered on top of existing games as op-
posed to being an integrated part of the game. Our third-party mediation system
is a bit of both: it is layered on top of an existing general negotiation setting, but
at the same time will be integrated into the negotiation proceeding in a way that
















Figure 3.2: The prisoner’s dilemma modified to allow for agents to choose to let a
mediator play for them. In this game, the agents dominate strategy is to let the mediator
play for them.
mediators are given permission to play on behalf of an agent, whereas our mediator
will facilitate the negotiation for both agents but will not play for them.
Our mediation system is more akin to the market mechanism of Bartal et al.
[2]. In their work, Bartal et al. have a set of buyers and sellers, where each
seller is selling one good identical to each other seller’s good, and the buyers and
sellers have different valuations for this type of good. The mechanism developed
manages to pair up buyers and sellers and come up with a negotiation range called
a Zone of Possible Agreements (ZOPA) for each pair, within which the agents are
guaranteed a positive utility. The mechanism provides the buyers with the high
end of the ZOPA range and the sellers with the low end, and then lets the agents
themselves negotiate the final price. The information provided to the agents is used
as a guarantee of a beneficial agreement to both parties, where the seller does not
agree to anything below the bottom of the ZOPA and the buyer does not agree to
anything above the upper end of the ZOPA.
The truly remarkable thing about this work is that by pairing trading partners
correctly and determining a negotiation range (as part of the pairing process) in-
stead of just assigning a price to each trading pair, the mechanism becomes efficient,
individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced. The authors are
able to circumvent the results of Myerson and Satterthwaite using this idea of let-
ting the agents themselves finalise the negotiations, acting merely as a mediator to
the market process. This is the essence of our mediation process, create a particular
negotiation scenario and allow agents to formalise the final agreement within the
parameters we provide them. Our system will not be able to guarantee the same
results however, and this is mainly due to the fact that we deal with the bilateral
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case, whereas Bartal et al. have multiple buyers and sellers to play off of each other.
3.3 Agendas and Incremental Negotiation
3.3.1 Agendas
Fershtman [8] was one of the early researchers to show how agendas can affect the
final agreement of a negotiation. Like many researchers, he used a model of splitting
pies; where a pie represents an issue. He used two pies and had agents negotiate
the division of the pies one at a time. After both divisions were negotiated, the
agents could “consume” their portion of the pies.
The catch in Fershtman’s study was that the pies where valued asymmetrically
by the agents such that each agent’s favourite pie was different, but the amount
they valued their favourites were the same. Additionally, there was a time discount
factor in place that meant the longer negotiations continued, the smaller the pies
became. Fershtman showed that in this setting, an agent wants to negotiate the pie
it likes the most second, owing to the fact that the other agent will be impatient to
eat its ever-diminshing share of the first pie, which happens to be its favourite pie.
Fershtman’s setting was rather simplistic with only two issues and being com-
plete information, but two important points were made: using different agendas
changes the final agreement and agreements in this study were usually inefficient.
The agreements were inefficient because each agent had a portion of pie that they
did not really care about, when the efficient agreement would have each agent pos-
sessing all of its favourite pie. The problem that arose was that when negotiating
the pies separately, agents can not make tradeoffs with respect to their asymmetric
valuations of the pies.
Fatima et al. [7] performed a more thorough examination of the use of agen-
das under complete and incomplete information settings with many issues. They
explored three situations in each setting, characterised by how many issues were
negotiated at a time: all issues at once, one issue in each stage, and multiple issues
in each stage. What they found was that the “package deal” (all issues at once) was
the most able to reach Pareto-efficiency but also the most computationally expen-
sive. The explanation for this is that the package deal allows the most flexibility
in making tradeoffs amongst asymmetrically valued issues, although this ability to
find all the tradeoffs to form pareto-optimal solutions comes at a computational
cost.
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Clearly, these results indicate the need for maneuverability for making tradeoffs
amongst the issues. However, there are some problems we have with these studies.
In our work, we try to maintain a general and realistic negotiation setting, sup-
ported by not assuming complete information and keeping our assumptions about
the agents to a minimum. Fershtman’s setting assumed complete information and
Fatima et al.’s best results would require fully rational agents that can determine
the optimal solutions across all the issues. We would like to reduce the thresh-
old required to achieve optimal (or near optimal) agreements, while maintaining
issue tradeoff flexibility. This leads us to discuss research regarding incremental
negotiations.
3.3.2 Incremental Negotiations
The complexity in determining an optimal strategy in the package deal setting is
due to everything needing to be figured out all at once. If we separate the negotia-
tion into stages to make things simpler, we lose some of the tradeoff flexibility. The
compromise is an idea espoused by John and Raith [11, 12] that suggests negoti-
ating in stages but allow renegotiation of issues in stages that have already been
negotiated; they refer to this as an “increasing-pie model”. This means in the last
stage the full range of issues is available to be negotiated, but at the same time
negotiation is simpler because it is broken down into parts.
One might ask how such an incremental negotiation procedure is simpler since
at each stage we are just adding more and more issues for the agents’ consideration.
The reason it is still simpler is that as we add new issues at each stage, we are also
constrained by the partial agreement from the previous stage. Not all options for
the issues need to be considered since we do not deal with the entire solution space
for the given set of issues, but only a smaller space of viable solutions defined by
the previous agreements. On the other hand though, this constraining factor can
also be a disadvantage since it could direct attention away from the more desirable
areas of the solution space similar to finding a local maximum in hill-climbing that
is not the global maximum. Despite this, we use the agendas with renegotiation
approach and will actually turn this “disadvantage” of a constrained space into a
tool for guiding agents to desirable areas of the solution. We explore how this can
be done in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Constraining the Solution Space
The essential purpose of our mediator framework is going to be to guide agents
through the solution space, the utility space of all possible agreements. If agents are
left to negotiate an agreement on their own, then they face a search problem through
an agreement space that neither agent knows the exact shape of, and contains many
elements which are undesirable for one or both agents. Our mediator will reduce the
agreement space to desirable agreement points, thus focusing the attention of the
agents in an appropriate fashion. To this end, we propose using a mediator who will
suggest intermediary agreements, with the understanding that these agreements are
to be incrementally improved upon by the agents themselves. By doing this, we
can control the subspace of solutions that arise from the intermediary agreement
point and thus steer the direction of the final agreement.
4.1 Constraints of Intermediary Agreements
Consider Figure 4.1 (a), a solution space entirely unconstrained where the default
agreement, or starting point, is the origin. Agents negotiating in this space will
have a “reasonable” solution space that will look something like the subspace, R,
in Figure 4.1 (b). This “reasonable” space arises from natural constraining factors:
both agents want to gain some utility over the default agreement (moving away
from the origin), but are unlikely to agree to something that gives them little utility
while the other agent receives a lot of utility (moving away from the perpendicular
axes of the space R). Within R, the negotiated agreement for this space might be



















Figure 4.1: (a) An unconstrained utility space. (b) The subspace, R, of the uncon-
strained space that forms the set of “reasonable” solutions given the natural constraint
that each agent wants more utility than the default agreement (the origin) but also
does not want a very unbalanced agreement. (c) Examples of possible solutions within
the reasonable space of solutions R. The solution marked O is a desirable solution for
the negotiation, arbitrarily chosen.
Let point, O, in Figure 4.1 (c) be a solution that we would like the agents to
attain. If there were a way to make it so that agents are only focused on the utility
space near O, then it would be far more likely that the agreement would be closer
to O than if the same agents negotiated in the unrestricted space of Figure 4.1 (a).
This is the purpose of using intermediary agreements derived by the mediator.
If a mediator provides intermediary agreement SNT0 (see Figure 4.2 (a)), then
the new reasonable space of solutions becomes R′, since the same natural constrain-
ing factors apply and neither agent wants to receive less utility than it already has in
the intermediary agreement. With this new space of consideration, R′, agreements
a and b in R, become something more like a′ and b′ in R′, respectively (see Figure
4.2 (b)). The reduced space brings agreements closer to O because all the agents’
attention is on the space R′ that is focused around O; by virtue of the restricted
space, almost any reasonable agreement is close to O.
A further benefit of constraining the solution space with intermediary agree-
ments is that we are more likely to achieve more efficient agreements since agents
are starting from a more efficient default agreement (SNT0 in Figure 4.2 (a)), by














Figure 4.2: (a) The reasonable subspace of solutions, R′, when the utility space is
constrained by an intermediary agreement, SNT0. (b) Where the example solutions, a
and b, from Figure 4.1 (c) would likely appear when agents are given an intermediary
agreement to start with. The new solutions, a′ and b′, are much closer to the desired
solution O than a and b were in the unconstrained space.
back and forth with offers that bring them up to the level of SNT0, but instead
they immediately focus their efforts advancing beyond an agreement like SNT0.
Even though the main goal of using intermediary agreements is guidance towards
a desired area of the solution space, there is also an effect on efficiency since the
constrained space an intermediary agreement creates is also a more efficient starting
space.
4.2 Adding Stages
If we extend the idea of mediating intermediary agreements to mediating several
intermediary agreements distributed through an incremental negotiation process,
we obtain an incremental method with which to guide agents towards a specific
point on the efficient frontier.1 By introducing more than one stage to the process,
1Later when we start looking at the instantiation of our mediator framework, we are actually
going to be doing the inverse of what is suggested here: given intermediary agreements, we will
look for the agenda that best guides agents to a desired agreement on the efficient frontier, but
not actually create the intermediary agreements specifically to guide agents to this chosen desired
agreement.
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the mediator has the ability to constrain the solution space at multiple stages and
take advantage of the negotiations of the agents.
Consider a situation where agents negotiate half of the issues first and then the
other half is negotiated incrementally off of the agreement from the first half. If a
mediator is allowed to introduce intermediary agreements in each of these stages,
then we get a situation like in Figure 4.3 (a). The mediator actually introduces
only one intermediary agreement over all the issues, but when the agreement is
broken down into stages, it becomes SNT0 and SNT1 in the figure, with SNT1
including the issues from stage one as well.2 In the first stage the mediator has
proposed intermediary agreement SNT0, restricting agents to the subspace A, and
in the second stage, the mediator proposes SNT1, which restricts the agents to
the subspace B in stage 2. When the agents negotiate the first stage, coming up
with agreement z0, see how this affects the second stage in Figure 4.3 (b). The
combination of SNT1 and z0 actually reduces the subspace under consideration in
the second stage to an area even closer to the efficient frontier, and hopefully also
closer to our desired solution; if we did not have stages, we could not take advantage
of this combined effect of the intermediary agreement and the stage negotiations of
the agents.
This example has shown how a third-party ability to intervene provides a signif-
icant measure of control over the location of the final agreement of the negotiation,
while still allowing agents to be part of the negotiation process. The ideas in this
chapter will be central to our instantiation of the mediator framework that is in-
troduced in in Chapter 5.

















Figure 4.3: (a) A two stage negotiation with intermediary agreements constraining
both stages. SNT0 constrains the first stage to the space A, and SNT1 constrains the
second stage to the space B. An example of an agent-negotiated solution in the first
stage, z0, is also shown. (b) The shaded area shows the constrained solution space for
the second stage when we take into account both the intermediary agreement for the
stage, SNT1, and the negotiated stage agreement from stage one, z0. Notice how the
point SNT1 is pushed towards the frontier by the excess of z0 over SNT0 in the first






The Bilateral Automated Mediator (BAM) negotiation framework approaches the
problem of bilateral incomplete information negotiations by using a combination
of methods and ideas to attack the problem from multiple angles. Due to the
inherent difficulties of obtaining accurate information about agent information in
the bilateral setting1, one of the hallmarks of the BAM framework is that the
agents are involved in the final negotiating stage in order to act as a self-correcting
step in the system. By keeping the agents involved in the ratification of the final
agreement, our system differs from a traditional mechanism that takes the input
of agents and provides a solution. Instead we take input from the agents, create a
temporary solution, and then try to re-utilise the agents’ preferences (as expressed
by the offers they make and accept or reject) as a secondary input phase that
moulds the temporary solution our system provides into something more reflective
of the specific negotiation scenario facing the agents. The BAM framework guides
agents to a part of the solution space that it thinks is generally a good area to
explore and then lets the agents explore it.
We will see later some of the more specific goals of the BAM framework and the
particular instantiation of it that we have created, however the general framework
has two major goals:
1. To encourage thought and research into hybrid approaches to negotiations, in
1Sometimes it is possible to obtain the agents’ private information in particular multilateral
settings by being able to “play agents off each other” as in Bartal et al. [2].
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order to overcome the difficult realities of actual negotiations (that are often
assumed not to exist in current negotiation research).
2. To manipulate the negotiation situation in a beneficial manner by creating
a negotiation procedure for the agents to work within that guides them to
desirable areas of the solution space of agreements.
The first goal is important because a lot of the literature tends to be focused
on particular, very specific problems, or are forced to assume that the difficult
realities in general problems do not exist in their problem setting. This is always
a necessary approach in research to further the field, but we think it is time to re-
explore the general realistic problem of negotiation, by utilising hybrid approaches
that combine different negotiation tools to tackle the overall problem. Our work is
a first step in encouraging this line of thinking, and we provide a framework within
which these kinds of ideas can be explored.
The second goal is the topic of the rest of this chapter. We will first look at the
particular negotiation setting that we will use in our model, then we examine the
general BAM framework and how it structures the negotiation process through the
application of multiple negotiation tools, then we explore a specific instantiation
of the modules of the framework, and finally we mention some concluding remarks
about the framework.
5.1 Negotiation Setting
The bilateral negotiating environment we study consists of the following:
• Two agents known as the buyer, b, and the seller, s,
• A set of issues on which to negotiate, I = {I0, I1, . . . , In}
The agents are called the buyer and the seller because each issue can be thought
of as a good for which a price is being negotiated.2 For simplicity, we assume the
range of prices that can be agreed upon is normalised to be [0, Vj] for some constant
Vj, for issue Ij, which is known to both agents.
2In reality, an issue can be anything that can be negotiated on. It could be, for example,
how many weeks vacation employees get per year. Sometimes, the naming of agents as a buyer
and seller confuses people into thinking issues are actually items being exchanged, when it really
reflects the idea that the issues will be normalised such that the buyer always wants low prices
and the seller always wants high prices for each issue.
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Definition 4 (Agreement) For a set of issues, I = {I0, I1, . . . , In}, an agree-
ment is a mutually agreed upon set of prices p = [p0, p1, . . . , pn], one price per
issue where 0 ≤ pj ≤ Vj. A partial agreement is just a subset of an agreement,
ppartial ⊂ p.
For each issue, Ij, each agent has a private reservation price, r
s
j for the seller and
rbj for the buyer. The reservation prices represent the lowest and highest acceptable
prices for the seller and buyer, respectively; sellers prefer higher prices on issues,
while buyers prefer lower prices. If the agreed upon price for issue Ij be pj, then
if rsj ≤ pj, the seller experiences non-negative utility on issue Ij, and if pj ≤ rbj ,
then the buyer experiences non-negative utility for this issue. Since agents in our
model have the ability to declare what their reservation prices are (and they are
not forced to declare their true reservation prices) we label r̂sj and r̂
b
j as the declared
reservation prices of the seller and buyer, respectively.
The reservation prices of the agents for each issue are drawn from a distribution
of possible values, which we will refer to as an agent’s reservation price range, or
RP range. On a particular issue Ij, there is a seller reservation price range of
RP sj = [0, xj], and a buyer reservation price range of RP
b
j = [yj, Vj].
3 It is assumed,
without loss of generality, that the prices on issues have been normalised to allow
for the seller’s range to start at 0 and the buyer’s to end at Vj. The reservation
price ranges are common knowledge to both agents and any third-party; xj and yj
are known by all parties of the negotiation. The common-knowledge assumption of
these distributions reflects the idea that the agents have some idea of what is an
acceptable price to their negotiating partner for an issue. For simplicity, we will
use uniform probability distributions over these ranges.
Abusing definitions a bit, we will refer to the range between the agents’ reser-
vation values as the balance of trade or trade balance.4 The balance of trade is an
idea of how much bargaining room there is for the price of a given issue; another
way one could think about it is as a profit made on a joint venture. The negotiation
process on the issue then becomes how to split the profits between the two agents.
There are two forms of the balance of trade depending on whether we are consid-
ering the agents’ RP ranges (which are common knowledge to all), or whether we
are considering the actual reservation prices which are private information held by
each agent. When we talk about RP ranges, we will refer to the perceived balance
3If we are only referring to a single issue, we may sometimes refer to the reservation price
ranges using the following values: RP sj = [sL, sH ] and RP
b
j = [bL, bH ].
4We say we are abusing definitions here because the term balance of trade actually refers to
the difference between the value of importation and exportation of goods and services. That is,
it is a scalar value, not a range.
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of trade, and when we talk about the actual reservation prices, we will refer to the
actual balance of trade.
Definition 5 (Perceived Balance of Trade) The range between the two agents’
common-knowledge RP ranges. For issue Ij, the seller’s RP range is [0, xj] and the
buyer’s RP range is [yj, Vj]. When xj ≤ yj, we will write the perceived balance of
trade as (xj, yj), and when xj > yj, we will write the perceived balance of trade as
−(yj, xj).
Definition 6 (Actual Balance of Trade) The range between the two agents’
actual reservation prices. For issue Ij, when r
s
j ≤ rbj, we will write the actual
balance of trade as (rsj , r
b




j, we will write the actual balance of
trade as −(rbj , rsj).
For either type of trade balance, we will refer to the size of the trade balance
as the absolute value difference of the two extreme ends of the range. When a
trade balance is non-negative, we will refer to it as a surplus (perceived or actual),
and when the trade balance is negative we will refer to it as a deficit (perceived or
actual). Figure 5.1 illustrates the difference between the two definitions.
The perceived deficit is the main problem that occurred in the bilateral trad-
ing problem (Section 2.3.2) and results in the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem (see
Theorem 1 page 15). When agents do not know if there is an actual surplus, it is
difficult to create individually rational mechanisms for negotiation because there is
no incentive-compatible way to guarantee non-negative utility for both agents; the
multi-issue case is very similar. In order to guarantee some theoretical properties
later on, we may need to make the assumption that all issues have a perceived
(and thus actual) surplus. This is a relatively strong, and sometimes, unrealis-
tic assumption because it means it is possible for both agents to experience non-
negative utility on every issue. Not only that, this possibility is known beforehand
as common-knowledge, which makes it easier to see where to focus price negotia-
tions on every issue. In our experimental simulation, we drop this assumption, but
we also lose some of our theoretical guarantees.
Lastly, agents have different preference weightings for the issues to reflect both
the actual private preferences of the agents and to account for the normalisation
of the issues’ agreement ranges; we will refer to these weightings as the agents’
valuations. The valuations represent how much utility one normalised unit in the
price of an issue is worth to the agent; it is assumed that all valuations are positive
(otherwise the seller might want low prices or the buyer high prices, but the issues
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Figure 5.1: An example of trade balances. The reservation price (RP) ranges shaded in
the figure represent the possible locations of each agent’s respective reservation price.
The RP ranges are common knowledge to all participants in the system, and so the
perceived trade balance is also public knowledge. The reservation prices of the agents,
shown as vertical lines within the RP ranges, are the private information of each agent.
The actual trade balance which is based on these private values is not actually known
to anyone in the system since no agent or third-party knows the private information of
both agents.
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have already been normalised such that neither of these is the case). We denote
the seller’s and buyer’s valuations as λsj > 0 and λ
b
j > 0, respectively. We do
not, however, presuppose that the relative utilities of agents are comparable; these
valuations only represent how an agent internally ranks the issues in importance
against other issues. These valuations, like the reservation prices, are drawn from
common knowledge distributions (that are uniformly distributed): λsj ∈ (0, Λsj ] and
λbj ∈ (0, Λbj]. That these distributions are common-knowledge reflects the idea that
agents have a general idea of which issues are more important to the other agent.
To summarise the negotiation environment, we define the utility for each agent:
Definition 7 (Agent Utilities) The utility of each agent for an agreement p =











where the valuations λsj, λ
b




j are private infor-
mation.
Finally, we have one last requirement not usually made for multi-issue negoti-
ations research: that every negotiation ends in agreement. This does not actually
affect our model, but instead reflects the fact that there are many types of negoti-
ations, particularly labour disputes, where this is a requirement. The actual effect
this has is that our “no-agreement” state is a default agreement, possibly a very
inefficient one.
5.2 BAM Negotiation Framework
The BAM framework is a negotiation framework that provides an outline for cre-
ating a third-party mediator that produces negotiation procedures for agents to
follow. The framework is illustrated in Figure 5.2, and consists of the following
four modules through which the negotiation flows: the setup, arbitration, protocol,
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Figure 5.2: The BAM framework showing the information flow of the negotiation
process through the mediator system. Agents declare their private information to the
mediator which is received by the arbitration module. The arbitration module passes on
this information as well as an initial agreement to the protocol module. The protocol
module outputs the initial agreement and a negotiation procedure, which together, form
the negotiation protocol that is the output of the mediator.
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arbitration and protocol modules, the mediator is not actually involved in the other
two. We will explain the framework by looking at the flow of the negotiation.
First, agents determine the public and private information of the system in the
Setup Module. Then agents declare their private information (possibly untruthfully)
to the Arbitration Module. The arbitration module uses the declared information
to come up with a set of agreement prices, one per issue, that forms the initial
agreement; the initial agreement forms the default agreement at the beginning of
negotiations. The declaration information and the initial agreement are passed to
the Protocol Module, which must determine the type of negotiation procedure the
agents will use. Finally, in the Negotiation Module, the agents are left to negotiate
on their own, starting with the initial agreement and following the negotiation
procedure specified by the mediator.
The main purpose of bringing in a third-party is to ameliorate the difficulties
involved in negotiating under uncertainty. Agents have a hard time knowing where
to start negotiations and where to make tradeoffs amongst the various issues in
order to achieve the best utility. The situation is exacerbated by the common
occurrence of agents treating each other as adversaries, since efficiency is lost in
the struggle to “win” the negotiation. It will be very difficult for the agents to
come up with an efficient agreement if they do not work together to determine
the best tradeoffs among the issues. Instead, they will waste all their effort just
reaching an agreement and not focus on improving that agreement once it is found.
A third-party, by virtue of being an impartial party, or at least being perceived as
more impartial than either agent, can achieve things that neither agent trusts the
other agent to do.5 In our framework, the mediator is able to poll the information
of the agents and form an initial agreement for the agents to build upon. An initial
agreement posed by a mediator is easier for agents to accept as a starting point than
an agreement posed unilaterally by either agent. Additionally, having a position to
work from helps agents explore where issue tradeoffs exist.
Another major purpose of using a third-party, is to bring parties together and
focus them on productive areas of discussion. Initial agreements are a first step in
this regard, in fact the whole framework itself is designed for the purpose of guiding
agents through the solution space. We do have to acknowledge, however, that much
like the bilateral trading problem (Section 2.3.2), it may be impossible to come up
with a revelation mechanism that guarantees the acquisition of honest information
from the agents. This means that no matter how well we guide the agents and take
advantage of our status as an impartial party, our efforts are based on uncertain
5In our work, the third party will actually be impartial, striving to be unbiased while trying
to help both agents.
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data and may need refinement; the negotiation module provides this refinement.
As mentioned earlier, agents can refine our solution as a self-correcting step for
our inability to know their true preferences and the crudely inefficient measures we
need to take because of this lack of omniscience.
To summarise our framework, the mediator guides the agents through the so-
lution space but does not take total control of the negotiation away from them.
Instead, the framework allows the agents to modify the mediator’s efforts so that
they are more accurately aligned with the true preferences of the agents.
We would like to reiterate that this framework is meant for general use in incom-
plete information scenarios. The only requirements are that the arbitration module
come up with some initial agreement and that the protocol module specify the
negotiation procedure to be used. The only real constraint is that the negotiation
procedure used must support using an initial agreement in some capacity, although
this likely leads to an incremental style of negotiation. Negotiations can be quite
complex. In separating the mediator module into two sub-modules, the task of
mediating an incomplete information negotiation is broken down into smaller sub-
tasks that are easier to manage. Although the most efficient mediation solution
is probably a globally considered algorithm, the complexity of such methods make
them elusive.
Although there are no other constraints on the framework, the approach we
take is to obtain certain properties in the early stages of the mediation process and
then maintain these properties while trying to achieve different properties later
on. We guarantee individual rationality and one-sided incentive compatibility in
the arbitration module’s initial agreement, without concern for efficiency. Then,
through the use of agendas developed in the protocol module, we try to guide the
agents to an efficient and fair solution based on our solution that satisfies IR and
one-sided IC. By controlling the format of negotiations, it is possible to encourage
certain desirable areas of the solution space to be explored over less profitable areas.
By separating our overall mediation goals into modular parts, it is possible that
we sacrifice some efficiency that could be obtained through a globally-determined
solution, but it also produces a more manageable mediator process that is easier
to maintain and update. One of the major benefits of this framework is that local
improvement can be made in one module without necessarily having to change
other modules, allowing easy implementation of improvements to the mediator.
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5.3 Our Arbitration Module
As mentioned earlier, the agents’ declarations form the input to the arbitration
module. The private information that agents declare consist of their reservation
prices for each issue, their utility valuations for each issue, and the declaration
of “valuation chips” that are used in the valuation chip mechanism described in
Section 5.3.2.
The arbitration module will generally consist of some set of mechanisms that
determine an initial agreement based on agent declarations. Ideally, we would like
these mechanisms to be incentive-compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR),
but as mentioned before this is difficult to achieve. Our arbitration module consists
of two declaration mechanisms, one that takes reservation prices as input and the
other which uses “valuation chips” as input. The reservation price mechanism is
called the Greedy Punishment Solution (GPS) and the other is called the Valuation
Chips mechanism. The GPS mechanism is one-sided IC and ex-post or ex-interim
IR (depending on whether or not we make the assumption that the trade balance
is always a surplus). The valuation chips mechanism is fully IC and ex-post IR.
The interaction of the arbitration module mechanisms is illustrated in Figure
5.3. First the reservation prices are fed into the GPS, which produces an agreement
labeled “basis agreement” in the diagram. This agreement is like an intermediary
initial agreement which may be modified by the valuation chips mechanism. Besides
this intermediary initial agreement, the valuation chips mechanism also receives as
input the placement of valuation chips by the agents (described later). The output
from the valuation chips mechanism is the actual initial agreement used in the
negotiation module.
5.3.1 Greedy Punishment Solution (GPS)
The greedy punishment solution is our way of determining the starting base prices
for an initial agreement; it takes reservation price declarations from the agents and
produces an intermediary agreement that will eventually turn into the initial agree-
ment of the negotiations. We strive to equally divide any surplus or deficit between
the two agents so that neither agent is helped or harmed more than the other.
However, we do not know what the actual trade balance on any issue is because we
cannot guarantee that agents reveal their true reservation prices to the mediator.
The idea behind the GPS is that we do not want agents to make declarations that
appear greedy. Our definition of being greedy is that an agent makes a reservation
















Figure 5.3: The interactions of the arbitration module.
it really is (i.e. its declaration would normally result in a more favourable price for
that agent). Consider the following example:
Typically in a negotiation, parties make initial offers which are unac-
ceptable to each other and slowly move their offers towards each other
until an agreement is reached. This sort of procedure often results in an
agreement at the midpoint of the two initial offers, so if an agent makes
a more extreme initial offer it is actually to its benefit.
Say the seller and buyer are negotiating over a single issue with the
seller’s actual reservation price being 20 and the buyer’s actual reser-
vation price being 80 (that is rs = 20 and rb = 80). If each agent
declares their reservation prices truthfully (r̂s = rs and r̂b = rb), then
the agreement price will be around 20+80
2
= 50. But if the buyer claims
his reservation price is r̂b = 50, then the likely agreement price is going
to be 20+50
2
= 35. And even if the price did not end up being as low
as 35 with r̂b = 50, the price will probably still be lower than the true
“fair” price of 50. The seller can also benefit by lying and saying its
reservation price is higher than it actually is. Now the problem becomes
that both agents have to strategically lie so that they are not cheated
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by the other agent’s lie.
Now consider what happens if the buyer actually declares a higher
reservation price, say r̂b = 100. Now the agreement price becomes
20+100
2
= 60. This sort of declaration actually hurts the buyer because
the buyer wants a lower price; the buyer is certainly not being greedy
here.
Definition 8 (Greedy) A buyer is being greedy when r̂b < rb and a seller is
being greedy when rs < r̂s. That is, a buyer declares a lower price than its actual
reservation price and a seller declares a higher price than its actual price.
How can we stop agents from acting strategically with their reservation price
declarations? Ideally, we just want them to tell the truth, but perhaps we can settle
for making it so that they are not acting “greedy”. The GPS does this by making
it painful for agents to be greedy, and beneficial for them to not be greedy. This is
not the same as the agents being truthful however, instead it means that lying in
the direction of being greedy will harm an agent and lying in the opposite direction
will benefit an agent (this is the idea behind one-sided IC). Therefore it is in an
agent’s best interest to declare the “weakest” reservation price possible, which is
at the extreme end of its reservation price range. We still will not know the true
value of the reservation prices, but this type of declaration is sort of like the agent
saying that they are flexible with the price and gives the mediator room to work
with in the trade balance.
The Figure 5.4 will help us illustrate the specific implementation of the contin-
uous GPS.
First observe that the starting price, p, is in the exact middle of the trade
balance, S, which means each agent has received the benefit of half of the surplus
S = yj−xj. Let the agents’ share of the surplus be ss = S2 for the seller and sb = S2
for the buyer. The GPS gives at least this amount of the surplus to an agent if that
agent does not act greedily, but if it does act greedily then portions of this surplus
will instead be given to the other agent (meaning the price p will shift). We declare

















p = (xj + yj) / 2greediness greediness
ss sb
Figure 5.4: The RP range of the seller and buyer are shown and are RP sj = [0, xj] and
RP bj = [yj, Vj], respectively. This makes the perceived balance of trade (xj, yj), which




j and the declared
reservation prices are r̂sj and r̂
b
j . The “greediness” of each agent has also been labeled
showing how far away from the extreme ends of the price range they declared as their
reservation price.
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These fractions represent how greedy an agent was with respect to the size of
its surplus. These values also represent how much of its share of the surplus an
agent will lose due to greediness; the higher these values are, the more an agent
loses. Explicitly, the new price for issue Ij using the GPS mechanism is:
GPS Price Adjustment
pj = p− ssGs + sbGb (5.1)
We see in the price adjustment equation that the greedier a seller is, the lower
the price goes, and the greedier a buyer is, the higher the price goes.6 This price
adjustment is performed on every issue and this gives us the intermediary agreement
that will be given to the valuation chips mechanism.
Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
We mentioned earlier that the GPS is one-sided IC and possesses different levels of
IR depending on our assumptions. We have already seen what one-sided IC means
for declaring reservation prices: it is in an agent’s best interest not to appear
greedy, and in fact being as modest as possible is the best thing to do. IR means
that agents receive non-negative utility, and this occurs if the price for an issue
satisfies rsj ≤ p ≤ rbj . We are always able to guarantee ex-ante IR, and we have
ex-post IR if we assume that no issue has a perceived deficit (see definition 5).
Before we prove these results, there is one important thing to note about the
GPS mechanism: it treats all issues separately. This means that in order to prove
that the GPS satisfies the properties mentioned, we only need to prove it for a single
issue since there is no interaction between issues with respect to price adjustments
in the GPS.
Theorem 2 The GPS mechanism produces an agreement that is one-sided incentive-
compatible.
Proof We will only prove this for a single issue as that is all that is required due
to the independence of the issues.
6Of course, these two adjustments counteract each other so that if each agent is equally greedy
(Gs = Gb) then the price does not change. However, we will see later that there is no advantage
in trying to strategically lie based on the other agent’s greediness.
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Consider the price adjustment equation for some issue Ij: pj = p− ssGs + sbGb.
The seller would like pj to be as high as possible, and since p, s
s, and sb are fixed,
the only way that can happen is if Gs is small and Gb is large (the seller must not
be greedy and the buyer must be greedy). The seller has no control over what Gb
will be, so it must focus on making Gs as small as possible. Gs =
r̂sj−0
xj−0 is minimised
if r̂sj = 0, or in other words, if the seller lies as much as possible in the direction that
gives it a weaker bargaining position, which is the definition of one-side incentive
compatibility in this situation. The seller has no incentive to be greedy since that
would just raise pj and reduce the seller’s utility.
The argument is analogous for the buyer and thus one-sided IC is satisfied by
the GPS.
¤
Theorem 3 If every issue has a perceived surplus, then the GPS mechanism is
ex-post individually rational.
Proof (We only prove this for an arbitrary issue Ij, as required.)
Because of the way the GPS performs its price adjustment for issue Ij (pj =
p− ssGs + sbGb), the price pj will never be outside of the trade balance no matter
what the agents declare. This means that xj ≤ pj ≤ yj, noting that our assumption
of a perceived surplus implies xj ≤ yj. By definition of our negotiation environment,
rsj ≤ xj and yj ≤ rbj , and thus we have that rsj ≤ pj ≤ rbj . Since (pj − rsj) ≥ 0
and rbj − pj ≥ 0, we can see from the definition of the agents’ utilities (Definition
7 on page 48) that each agent will have non-negative utility for issue Ij (and thus
non-negative utility over all issues).
¤
Theorem 4 The GPS mechanism is ex-ante individually rational.
Proof (We only prove this for an arbitrary issue Ij, as required.)
We have two cases: (1) the issue has a perceived surplus and (2) the issue has
a perceived deficit. If the issue has a surplus, then the proof is the same as in the
Theorem 3 since ex-post IR is a stronger condition than ex-ante IR. If the issue
has a deficit, then we have to consider the expected value for the price of the issue
given by the GPS.
To assist in explaining the second case, we provide Figure 5.5 which is an issue
with a perceived deficit. In the diagram we use the values sL and bL for the low
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end of the seller and buyer’s reservation range, respectively, and similarly we use
sH and bH for the high end of the ranges.
We will focus on the seller’s expected utility for the issue, where the probability
of any given reservation price in its RP range is 1
sH−sL (due to the uniform probabil-







































































⇒ p ≥ 1
2
sH
An analogous calculation for the buyer shows that for ex-ante IR, p ≤ 1
2
(bH+bL).
So our full constraint for satisfying ex-ante IR is:
1
2
sH ≤ p ≤ 1
2
(bL + bH)
This constraint is always satisfiable since (bL + bH)− sH ≥ 0, because sH ≤ bH








Figure 5.5: An example of an issue with a perceived deficit. This diagram is used to
help explain the proof of Theorem 4. Instead of using [0, xj] and [yj, Vj] for the seller
and buyer’s reservation price ranges, they are labeled by the ranges [sL, sH ] and [bL,
bH ], respectively. This is to indicate that they are low and high prices in the ranges,
which makes the proof easier to read.
is the midpoint of the balance of trade. This is exactly where the GPS solution will
place the price for this issue as long as agents act rationally and do not attempt to
be greedy.
¤
5.3.2 Valuation Chips Mechanism
In the GPS mechanism, we focused on the private information of reservation prices.
Here we focus on the valuation of issues. Recall that a valuation of an issue repre-
sents how much utility an agent receives for one unit of price in that issue. Ideally,
we want to know the relative importance of the issues for each agent, meaning how
much more important is one issue over another to an agent. We do not care so
much about the exact valuations, as the scales used have no meaning for the medi-
ator, but instead we would like to obtain from each agent their ordering of issues
by importance and the amount of separation of importance between issues in the
ordering (this is illustrated in Figure 5.6). At the moment, the mechanism we use






























Figure 5.6: An example of the information we would like to acquire from an agent about
its valuations. We see on the left, the set of issues with valuations for an agent. We
would like to transform this information into the sorted ordering and scale of valuations
shown on the right. Currently our valuation ordering mechanism determines the ordering
but without the valuation scaling.
but without an idea of the relative importance of issues within the ordering; we
know that one issue is more important to an agent than another, but not by how
much.
How the valuation chips mechanism works is by giving each agent a set of chips
equal to the number of issues. Each chip in a set has a different value on it and
represents how much influence that chip has. The agents must assign one chip to
each issue as part of their declaration to the mediator. The chips then affect the
current prices of the agreement made by the GPS mechanism. The greater a value
a chip has, the greater it influences the price of the issue it is assigned to in favour
of the agent that assigned that chip. The assignment of chips then allows agents
to express their preferences for the issues by giving them an opportunity to adjust
the initial agreement in a way that reflects their preferences.
Valuation Chips Mechanism Given a negotiation as specified in Section 5.1
with n issues, each agent is given a set of n chips, each set being a dupli-
cate of the other, with all the chips within a set having different values. Let
the chips given to the seller be denoted by C and the chips given to the buyer
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denoted by D, and we will denote by subscripts the kth ordering of chips (such
that c1 is the smallest chip and cn is the largest chip in set C).
An arbitrary value called the chip shift amount, H, is chosen by the mechanism
that will be the largest amount an agent can shift the price of an issue using
its valuation chips (the value of H is the same for all issues and for each
agent). Knowing H, each agent must assign its set of chips to the issues, one
chip per issue. The declaration of chip placement is declared to the mediator
privately so that neither agent can base their assignment on the other agent’s
actions. We will denote chips assigned to issue Ij ∈ I with superscripts, such
that the chips assigned to Ij are c
j and dj (subscripts will still be used to
denote order within a chip set). The prices of the intermediary agreement
from the GPS mechanism are then modified as follows:











Note that the seller’s chip adds to the price of the issue and the
buyer’s chip subtracts from the price since a seller want a higher
price and a buyer wants a lower price.
The resulting agreement that has been adjusted for all issues becomes the
initial agreement that is the output of the arbitration module.
Before we prove some of the properties guaranteed by this mechanism, there are
a few points to note. First, the largest chip in the chipset allows an agent to shift
a price by the full shift amount, H, and the smaller chips allow shifts of smaller
degrees. Second, the shift of price for an issue is based on the difference between
the chips agents use for the issue; this reflects that an issue more important to one
agent will be shifted in favour of that agent. For example, if the seller puts cn on
an issue and the buyer d1, then the issue is much more important to the seller than
the buyer and the price on the issue will be shifted to reflect this. Third, we have
not specified how to choose H or whether there are any restrictions on it. The only




(min(pj, Vj − pj)) (5.2)
This says that H can be no larger than the smallest distance of the current price
to either end of the price range over all issues. The rationale for this constraint
is that we do not want the price on any issue to be able to be shifted outside of
the price range [0, Vj]. The method we actually use for choosing H is to choose
the smallest positive distance of the current price to either end of the trade balance
over all issues. If the trade balance for issue Ij is (tL, tH), then our H is:
H = min
Ij∈I
(min(pj − tL, tH − pj)) where H > 0 (5.3)
The rationale for choosing the chip shift amount like this is so that the shifted
price stays within the trade balance on as many issues as possible while still having
the shift amount be positive. In peculiar circumstances where many of the issues
have prices on the edge of the trade balance after the GPS (meaning their smallest
distance from their current price to the end of the trade balance is 0), it may be
desirable to also put a maximum value on H in order to maintain as many prices
as possible staying in their respective trade balances.
We mentioned earlier that our valuation chips mechanism is fully incentive-
compatible and ex-post individually rational. In this setting, this means that an
agent has no reason to lie about its ordering (i.e. it has no reason not to put its
largest chip on its most valued issue, and then its next largest chip on its next
most valued issue and so on) and an agent will not experience negative utility from
participating in this mechanism no matter what the other agent does. In proving
these results we show that an agent can affect its utility most positively by telling
the truth about its ordering and that nothing the other agent can do can make the
utility change resulting from this mechanism be negative if the agent assigns its
chips truthfully.
Just before we prove our results about the valuation chip mechanism, we want
to introduce the following useful definition:
Definition 9 ((Valuation Chip) Utility Influence on issue Ij) For an issue











for the seller and buyer, respectively.
We will refer to the summation of these equations over all issues as just the
utility influence for the seller and buyer, respectively.
Theorem 5 The valuation chips mechanism is incentive compatible, providing the
issue ordering of each agent, which is unique except for when there are issues that
are valued equally.
Proof WLOG we will assume we are considering the seller as our agent; the
buyer’s proof is analogous. Assume that the seller has assigned its chips such that
its largest chip is on its most important issue, its second largest chip is on its second
most important issue, and so on. Now, by way of contradiction assume that the
seller can increase its overall utility by swapping the chips for two issues that it
does not value equally.
Of the two issues having their chips swapped, let the higher valued issue be issue
Ij and the lower valued issue be Ik, and let the chips assigned to these issue in the
original ordering be cj and ck, respectively. This means that cj > ck and λj > λk
7.























7Recall that λ represents the agent’s valuation for an issue, the units of utility per unit price
on that issue.
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We only need to consider the influence on these two issues since the chip assign-
ment is the same for all the other issues. For our assumption about the seller being










⇒ (ckλj + cjλk) > (cjλj + ckλk)
⇒ ck(λj − λk) > cj(λj − λk)
⇒ ck > cj
However, this results in a contradiction because we know that cj > ck, and
therefore our assumption that the seller can increase its overall utility by swapping
the chips of two unequally valued issues must be impossible. Since we did this with
two arbitrary unequally valued issues, we see that it is not possible for the seller to
swap its chip assignment from a truthful assignment and receive more utility.
¤
Theorem 6 The valuation chips mechanism is ex-post individually rational if the
agents assign their chips in a truthful manner with respect to their preference or-
dering of the issues.
Proof The key to proving this result is to show for one agent, as long as it assigns
its chips truthfully revealing its true issue preference ordering, that there is no chip
assignment that can be made by the other agent that will result in the first agent
receiving less utility in the agreement after the valuation chip mechanism than in
the agreement before it (the agreement that comes from the GPS).
WLOG let us assume we are considering the seller as the agent under consider-
ation, and let the seller assigns its chips truthfully to the issues. We will show that
even if the buyer maximises its negative utility influence on the seller’s utility, the
seller will still not have negative utility overall. In this case the buyer wants the







j − dj)) (5.8)
The only control the buyer has over this summation is what values dj have,
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therefore in order to minimise Equation 5.8, the buyer really only needs to focus




But this is the same thing as the seller trying to maximise its share of the
its own utility influence! And by our proof of Theorem 5, we saw that the seller
maximises its utility influence by assigning its chips truthfully. We see then that
the chip assignment the buyer must make to minimise Equation 5.9 is the same chip
assignment(in terms of chip values) that the seller makes when making a truthful
assignment. Since this theorem assumes that the seller is playing truthfully, this
means that for every issue Ij we have c
j = dj and Equation 5.8 equals 0. But this
resulted from the buyer minimising the seller’s utility influence as much as possible
and thus we see that if the seller assigns its chips truthfully, it is impossible for it
to experience less utility in the agreement after the valuation chip mechanism has
run than the agreement before the mechanism has run.
¤
Now that we have explained the mechanism and proved its properties, we should
really ask ourselves why do we want the issue ordering in the first place? What
good is this ordering when we do not know the amount of spacing of importance
between issues? First of all, when we proceed to the protocol module, we need to
have some idea of relative utilities for issues in order to create agendas. Although it
would be ideal to know the spacing between issues, it is still useful to know just the
preference orderings of the agents. A second use that we have not yet exploited, is
that this information can be used to adjust the initial agreement prices even more
to reflect the issue orderings by performing price adjustments across multiple issues,
trading off on issue importance asymmetries so that the starting initial agreement
is even closer to what each agent wants. However, we must be careful taking any
actions based on the issue orderings retrieved from the valuation chips mechanism
because we can jeopardise its ability to satisfy IC and ex-post IR.
Constraints Spawning from the Valuation Chips Mechanism
For the valuation chips mechanism to work, the chips in a chipset must maintain
their ordering throughout the processing of the mediator system. That is, we must
maintain the following for the values of the chips:
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ci < ci+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (5.10)
di < di+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (5.11)
It may seem odd to specify this constraint since the values of the chips do
not actually change, however, their effective value can change if we modify the
agreement after the valuation chips mechanism runs. Say we wanted to change
some of the prices in the agreement such that they are better aligned with the issue
orderings we get from the valuation chips mechanism. By changing the prices it is
the same thing as changing the values of the chips that are assigned to those issues.
For example, say we have an issue Ij with a price adjustment (from the valuation




and now we want to change the price on this issue by one positive unit. This
effectively makes the perceived price adjustment
H
cn
(cj − dj) + 1
⇒ Hcn (c
j − dj) + HcnHcn
⇒ Hcn (c
j − dj + cnH )
By changing the price by one unit, we have changed the difference between the
buyer’s and seller’s chips by cn
H
on this issue. Although this change in chip value
should be distributed across both agent’s chips, from either agent’s point of view
they just know the price changed by one unit and the value of their chip (either
cj or dj) has effectively changed by the full amount cn
H
. To summarise, if we raise
the price of an issue in the agreement we make the seller’s chip on that issue worth
more and we devalue the buyer’s chip according to the following:









where ti is the amount of the price shift on the issue that chip ci has been as-
signed to, and tj is similar but for the buyer’s chip.
Now, we turn to the question of why is it important to maintain the constraint
in Equations 5.10 and 5.11? The whole mechanism hinges on the idea that the
agents know the order of their chipsets, and if the order changes after the agents
have assigned their chips then they may not want to assign them in the same way.
If agents think that the ordering of the chipsets may effectively change later on,
then they are uncertain how they should act: they no longer know what is the
rational course of action. This jeopardises our guarantees of IC and ex-post IR,
which is something we do not want to occur, and this is why we want to maintain
the constraint in 5.10.
5.3.3 Summary of Arbitration Module
The table in Figure 5.7 summarises the properties of the arbitration module and
the mechanism that compose it. Note that although both the GPS and valuation
chip mechanism affect the prices in the initial agreement output by the module,
each mechanism actually takes different declarations as input. The GPS takes
the reservation price declarations as input, whereas the valuation chips mechanism
takes the assignment of valuation chips to issues as its declaration input.
5.4 Our Protocol Module
Once the arbitration module has created an initial agreement, this agreement and
all other information the system has is fed into the protocol module. The protocol
module is responsible for coming up with the negotiation procedure that will be
used in the negotiation module. The instantiation of this module that we use will
create an agenda that will guide the negotiations. The actual negotiation procedure,
beyond the agenda, that we use is not as important and is explained in Chapter 6.
The method we use to create our agenda is geometrical, using utility space
representations of the negotiation environment to produce an agenda that fits our
desires of coming up with a fair and efficient final agreement. There are many
ways to extend the use of agendas in our system and some of these are explained
















Yes, w.r.t valuation chip 
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Yes, cumulative 





* = ex-post if every issue has a trade surplus
Figure 5.7: A summary of the game-theoretic properties of the arbitration module and
its inner mechanisms.
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5.4.1 Translating Issue Orderings to Utility Space
To use utility space in creating agendas, we need some way to convert the issues
into their respective utility representations. This amounts to deciding for each issue
Ij, how much utility that issue could represent to each of the buyer and seller. The
problem here comes back to the fact that we do not have exact information about
the valuation of issues for the agents nor what their reservation prices are, so we
will have to make some sort of estimation. Our estimation is based on two pieces
of information:
1. The perceived trade balance on the issue.
2. The issue preference orderings of each agent (from the valuation chips mech-
anism).
We use the perceived trade balance as if it where the whole price range such
that if the range is (xj, yj), then a price pj = xj would give the seller 0 utility and a
price pj = yj would give the buyer 0 utility. Note however, that we do not actually
need to know what pj is in the initial agreement to do this, we are just using the
trade balance as part of the basis for how much the issue is worth to the agents. If
an issue has a large trade balance, then it is likely worth a lot to the agents.
To obtain an estimation for the agents’ valuations of the issues, we need to
convert the preference orderings into valuations for each agent. We only have the
issue ordering for each agent, but now we have to assign some value for a utility
per price unit for each agent for each issue. In order to create these valuation
estimations, we need to have some separation between the issues in the ordering
and because we have no information about what the actual separations might be,
we will just evenly separate all the valuations. For example, if we have three issues
in an agent’s issue ordering, we might assign the highest issue a valuation of 10
utility/unit, the next highest issue 6 utility/unit, and the last issue 2 utility/unit.
Determining the amount of utility an issue will be worth in our utility space is
now simply an issue of taking the size of the trade balance and multiplying it by
the valuation estimations we have given to each agent for that issue. One thing to
note, that may not be obvious yet, is that the total amount of utility an issue is
worth to an agent is not the same as the agent’s estimated valuation; when ordering
the issues by total utility value to an agent, this ordering may not be the same as
the agent’s issue preference ordering that is based on its actual valuations. To see
































Figure 5.8: An example of converting preference orderings into utility for creating a
utility space. The numbers in the issues are the sizes of the perceived trade balance (see
Definition 5 for an explanation of how the perceived trade balance is determined for
an issue). The estimated utility starts by assigning an arbitrary valuation to the most
important issue and then decrementing this for each successive issue. Note that due to
the different sizes of the trade balances, it is possible for an issue of low importance to
actually be worth more, in total utility, than an issue of higher importance. This can be
seen with the first issue being worth 350 total utility, which is less than the 360 total
utility that the third issue is worth, even though the first issue has a higher valuation.
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Before we move on to elements of the agenda creation, we should specify our
actual transformation for turning issue preference orderings into estimated valua-
tions. Let us consider one agent’s issue ordering and for convenience let us say it
is {I0, I1, . . . , In−1}, where issue I0 is the agent’s most important issue. We will
denote our estimated valuation for issue Ij by λ
′
j, and the size of the perceived
trade balance as |Sj|. Finally, let u0 be some arbitrary amount of utility that we












i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
We can see from this that we just make sure that each issue in the ordering has
a smaller valuation than the one previous to it. We might also note from this that
we assign each agent the same estimated valuations.
5.4.2 Agenda Preliminaries
As mentioned earlier, we would like our agendas to guide agents to useful areas of
the solution space so they are more likely to negotiate an agreement that is fair and
efficient. What we will do is choose a solution in the utility space that we think
is a good solution, and then focus our efforts on making an agenda that tries to
direct the agents to that solution; our chosen solution will be the Nash Bargaining
Solution (Section 2.4.4). We would like to re-iterate however, that our agendas are
based on estimated information for the utility space and thus our chosen solution
in our estimated space really is a guide to the area where a good solution probably
exists.
In order to understand how we will create our agendas in a way that leads agents
to particular areas of the solution space, we need to consider a few concepts first.
The Yellow Brick Road: The Solution Line
The negotiation protocol that we are going to use will separate the negotiations
over several stages as in Figure 2.4. To be able to guide agents to a particular
area of the utility space over the course of these stages we need some way to focus








Figure 5.9: The solution line is just the line between the origin and our chosen solution
concept, in this case the NBS. (a) We want to guide agents along the solution line, the
shaded region acts as a “focus space” that we want to try and keep the intermediary
agreements within throughout the negotiation process. (b) An illustration of how a
negotiation might proceed if agents are guided along the solution line. The intermediary
agreements will typically zig-zag around the solution line, ending up at a solution near
both the efficient frontier and NBS solution.
negotiations. If agents stray too far of course early on in the negotiations, it may
be impossible to reach the desired solution area later on.
The idea we use for keeping agents focused is simple. We consider a part of the
utility space from the beginning of the negotiations to the end of the negotiations
that acts as a path towards the area of the space that we want agents to end up in.
This path is based on the solution concept we use for the entire space, in our case
the NBS. The solution line is just the line from the no agreement point (the origin)
to our chosen solution, the NBS. Throughout the negotiation process, through the
various stages, we want to continually guide agents along the solution line towards
the efficient frontier. This idea is shown in Figure 5.9.
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Desired Solutions
Ultimately, our desired solution is the global solution concept towards which we
want to guide the agents. To achieve this we need to focus agents along the solution
line, but how do we do this throughout the agenda? We break down this problem
into subproblems at each stage, such that we have a desired solution at each stage
and we create our agenda in a manner that it will guide agents to the desired
solution at each stage.
Definition 10 (Desired Solution) The desired solution at each stage is the lo-
cal agreement for the stage that we, as a mediator, would like agents to achieve
in order to be aligned with our desired global solution. The desired solutions for
the stages are simply the intersection points of the solution line with the efficient
frontier of each stage’s utility space.
Since we use the NBS as our global solution concept, we will denote the desired
solution for a stage i to be NBSi, and the global solution NBSn may also be
denoted by NBS∗. The idea of desired solutions is represented in Figure 5.10.
Expected Solutions
We now have a pretty good idea of our ideal solution concept and how it can be
envisioned within each stage of an agenda, however, we cannot expect agents to
come to an agreement at each stage that is the same as the desired solution. This
is true for a number of reasons, but the main reason we will focus on is that the
utility subspace agents are considering at a particular stage is not the same as the
global utility space.
If we look at the utility space defined by stage k in Figure 5.11(a), even if we
are considering the NBS for this subspace which is labeled as NBS ′k, it is not the
same as the desired solution for the stage at NBSk. Not every stage is going to
have a utility space that results in a local solution in line with our global solution,
even when using the same solution concept for the local space. This becomes even
more evident when we have an existing agreement that constrains our local space,
as in Figure 5.11(b). In that figure, the current agreement for the issues in stage k
is constraining the local space to only the small shaded rectangle, which contains
neither the desired solution NBSk, nor the local solution from part (a). In this case
the local solution, given just this smaller subspace, might be something like what
is labeled NBS ′k in Figure 5.11(b), which is even further away from the desired







Figure 5.10: The desired solutions for the stages are the intersections of the solution

















Figure 5.11: (a) In stage k, the utility space is the shaded region. The NBS for this local
space for the stage is located at NBS ′k which is not the same as the desired solution
NBSk. (b) The local utility space in stage k is constrained to an even smaller subspace
of reasonable solutions by the current agreement, SNTk. In this more constrained space,
the local solution, NBS ′k is even farther away from the desired solution of NBSk.
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The expected solutions that were calculated in the local (possible constrained)
subspace for a stage were done using an NBS solution. However, it is possible to
use any other solution concept to model the expected solution, it really depends on
what is the best solution concept to model the expected behaviour of the agents,
and this may vary between different types of agents. For example, if the mediator
had some information that one agent was a stronger bargainer than the other, we
might bias our expected solutions towards the stronger agent since we would expect
them to come out with a better than fair agreement most of the time. Still, there are
many other reasons we might use a different solution concept for locally expected
solutions.
Definition 11 (Expected Solution) The expected solution at each stage is the
local agreement that agents are expected to reach for the stage. The calculation of
the expected solution for each stage depends on the solution concept chosen to model
agents’ expected behaviour.
It is not even necessary to use the same solution concept for the global and
expected local solutions. Indeed, it may not even be desirable since the expected
behaviour may not be aligned well with the desired global solution. From our
previous example where one agent is a stronger bargainer, we may want a global
solution that is more fair than the biased expected solution concept and therefore
we use a Nash solution globally, but a biased solution locally. Nevertheless, for lack
of a more certain way to model general agents, we will be using the NBS for our
global solution as well as our expected local solution concept.
When we create our agendas, our goal will be to create an agenda in such a way
that the expected solution for each stage is relatively close to the desired solution
for the stage. In this way, we will guide the expected behaviour of agents towards
the desired global solution.
5.4.3 Agenda Creation
Creating an agenda is really just a matter of choosing a schedule for the issues to
be negotiated. The choice of an agenda involves answering a few questions:
How many stages will there be?
How many issues will be in each stage?
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Which issues will be in which stages?
For simplicity, we use a constant number of issues per stage, typically around
two to four issues. Let this constant be z, then there will be f = dn
z
e stages if we
have n issues. The only issue left to resolve is what order we will negotiate the
issues, or how we place the issues into the stages. Our basic algorithm for deciding
this is to look at every possible agenda, evaluate by some quality measure, and then
choose the agenda that has the best quality measure:
bestAgendaSoFar = null
for (each agenda, A in all possible agendas) do





This introduces two areas of inquiry, the first is in regard to how many agendas
there are and how much work is involved in looking at every agenda, and the
second is what is our quality measure. For a discussion about how many agendas
we actually have to consider using this method and how much computation needs
to be done to choose an agenda, see Appendix A. In this section we will focus
on how we measure the quality of a single agenda and what our quality measure
means.
The quality measure has to reflect the idea that a higher quality agenda is one
that is more likely to lead agents along the solution line, as we established that this
will be our method for directing the agents to jointly profitable solutions. We use
a simple measure of the distance in the utility space from the expected solutions
to the desired solutions throughout the stages of an agenda. The summations of
these measurements from each stage form our quality measure, that is, if dk = the
distance from the expected solution to the desired solution in stage k, then the
definition for our quality measure is:
Definition 12 (Agenda Quality Measure) The agenda quality measure, Q, for
























Figure 5.12: (a) Showing the distance measure for stage k from the example shown in
Figure 5.11(b). (b) Showing the quality/distance measure for an agenda of 3 stages.
The shaded region for each stage represents the space that the current agreement
restricts that stage to. The desired and expected solutions are not labeled, but the
desired solutions can be distinguished since they are on the solution line.
Our goal, when determining the best agenda, is to find the agenda, A∗, such
that A∗ = arg minA Q(A). Some examples of the distance measure for several stages
is shown in Figure 5.12. When we look at Figure 5.12(b) we see that each stage’s
utility space is being restricted by the current agreement so far, SNTk (for the
issues in that stage and lower). When we create our agendas, we only have the
initial agreement to work from, so our SNTk agreement values will just be the
partial agreement formed from the prices in the initial agreement for the issues in
stage k and lower.
5.4.4 Example of Choosing an Agenda
Figure 5.13 illustrates how we choose between two agendas based on our quality
measure (the desired solutions are shown as diamonds, the expected solutions as
Xs). In these two agendas, the last two stages are actually composed of the same





Figure 5.13: An example of choosing between two agendas. The expected solutions
are shown with Xs and the desired solutions as diamonds. Each agenda is the same
except for the first stage, which is why only the first stage shows the restricted subspace
shaded representing where the initial agreement is for that stage. If we are using our
measure Q(A) from Definition 12, then we want to minimise Q(A) and we can see that
d1 for agenda A2 is smaller than for agenda A1. Therefore, Q(A2) < Q(A1), and A2
is the better agenda.
choice of agenda comes down to which agenda has a smaller distance measure for
the first stage. It is clear that the expected solution is much closer to the desired
solution in the first stage for agenda A2, and therefore if we had to choose between
these two agendas, we would choose agenda A2.
5.4.5 Alternative Considerations for Agendas
The heart of our agenda creation, or our method of choosing an agenda out of the
possible agendas, was the simple quality measure we used. However, there are many
alternative ways to measure agendas and different types of agendas altogether that




In this section, we are going to go through a simple example of using our instan-
tiation of the BAM framework; this should make the workings of the framework
clearer.
Our negotiation will consist of four issues that will actually be real-world items.
The items and their associated reservation prices and valuations are shown in Figure
5.14. The reservation prices are in dollars and the valuations represent the amount
of utility an agent receives per one dollar price shift in its favour. In the case of
actual items, the valuations for a single agent might be the same for each item
(since a dollar on one issue is the same as a dollar on another), however, for the
sake of the example we give the agents different valuations for each item. Note that
the valuations for a given agent are drawn from the same valuation range for each
issue; this does not have to be the case, as each issue can have its own valuation
range.
The first thing we do now is convert these values into our standard normalised
representation where the price ranges are [0, 100]. This conversion also requires
conversion of the valuations since we want the valuations to be per unit of our
normalised price, not per unit dollar. Figure 5.15 shows the converted issues with
all the old prices shown as well.
To explain how to convert a price, let D be some price in dollars, and let [L, H]
be the total price range, in dollars, for the issue we are converting (the range that
covers both agents reservation price ranges). The new price is then:
pricenew =
D − L
H − L ∗ 100 (5.12)
Consider the price $5, which is the actual reservation price of the seller for issue
number two. It becomes the new price of 12.5 by the following conversion:
pricenew =
5− 4
12− 4 ∗ 100 = 12.5
The conversion for valuations is slightly different. First we need to determine
how much one dollar is worth in the normalised price range (this can be determined
by setting (D−L) = 1 in Equation 5.12. Dividing the old valuation by this amount
gives us the new valuation. So for example, the sellers valuation on issue two of 6
becomes 6
12.5















$60   [$60, $100]
$8     [$6, $12]
$170 [$110, $200]
$9     [$7, $13]
[$0, $40]  $40
[$4, $8]   $5
[$50, $70]   $60









[5, 10] [2, 5]
Valuation ranges
Figure 5.14: An example of a 4 item negotiation with all the reservation prices and
ranges shown, as well as all the valuations. Note that in this example, we are drawing
all valuations for an agent from a single range.
Now that all our values have been converted into the new units, we can begin
the declaration process. The agents will need to declare reservation prices and the
placement of valuation chips on the issues. Let the set of valuation chips provided
to the agents be {10, 5, 3, 1}, and the arbitrary chip shift amount be H = 10.
The declarations made be the agents are illustrated in Figure 5.16. The seller’s
reservation price declarations are shown with dotted lines and the buyer’s with
solid lines.
Once agents have made their declarations, the mediator takes over. As shown
in Figure 5.2, first the arbitration module runs, creating an initial agreement, and
then the protocol module creates an agenda. Within the arbitration module (see
Figure 5.3), first the GPS mechanism creates an initial agreement and then the
valuation chips mechanism makes modifications to this agreement.
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Figure 5.15: The issues converted into our normalised price ranges of [0, 100] and
valuations converted to from utilities per dollar to utility per price unit. All the dollar
values for the original reservation prices are shown with the normalised values as well.
5.5.1 Arbitration Module Example
The Greedy Punishment Solution
The GPS creates an initial agreement by applying the GPS price adjustment for
every issue:
pj = p− ssGs + sbGb
where the starting default price for each issue is the midpoint of the trade
balance. Recall that ss = sb, where each of these values is equal to half of the trade

























Figure 5.16: The agent declarations for the example. The chip placements are shown at
the sides of each issue, and the reservation price declarations are shown within the issues
graphical representation. The dotted lines within the issues are the seller’s reservation
price declarations, and the solid lines are the buyer’s declarations.
negotiation are:
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p1 = 50− (10 ∗ 20
40




p2 = 37.5− (12.5 ∗ 0) + (12.5 ∗ 0)
= 37.5
p3 = 26.65− (13.35 ∗ 20
20




p4 = 42.85− (28.55 ∗ 5
7




The initial agreement produced by the GPS is {p1 = 50, p2 = 37.5, p3 =
26.65, p4 = 41.49}. This agreement is provided as input to the valuation chips
mechanism.
Valuation Chips Mechanism
The valuation chips mechanism will modify the agreement that the GPS created.
The current price on each issue is modified by the valuation chips price adjustment:
H
cn
(cj − dj) (5.13)
where H = 10, cn = 10 (since 10 is the largest chip value). c
j and dj are the
value of the chips placed on issue j by the seller and buyer, respectively. According
to the declarations in Figure 5.16, we have:
{c1 = 5, c2 = 3, c3 = 10, c4 = 1}
{d1 = 1, d2 = 10, d3 = 5, d4 = 3}
This means the prices in the current initial agreement now become:
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Thus the finished initial agreement is {p1 = 54, p2 = 30.5, p3 = 31.65, p4 =
39.49}. This is the final output of both the valuation chips mechanism and the
arbitration module.
5.5.2 Protocol Module Example
The protocol module is in charge of creating the agenda for negotiations. In order
to evaluate agendas according to Section 5.4, we need to have a utility space repre-
sentation of the negotiation. To produce this space, we need valuation information,
but all we have are issue orderings. The seller’s issue ordering is {3, 1, 2, 4} and the
buyer’s is {2, 3, 4, 1}. We utilise these orderings and the perceived trade balances
in order to convert the issues into the maximum amount of utility they could be
worth to each agent (which is what we need to create a utility space).
The first thing to do is to produce valuation estimations as described on page 71.
In those equations, if we set u0 = 100, we have the following valuation estimations
for the seller and buyer (where superscript s or b refers to which agent the valuation









































































Using our estimated valuations, we can now get the estimated utility that each
issue can be worth for each agent. To do this, we multiply the perceived trade
balance by our estimated valuations for each agent. This makes the estimated




















4 ∗ 85.7 = 80.2













Figure 5.17: The utility space of our 4 item negotiation based on the estimations of
the valuations and the size of the actual trade balance. The Nash Bargaining solution
is shown on the efficient frontier as well as the solution line. The frontier is constructed




















4 ∗ 85.7 = 171.4
Summing these values, this means the total (estimated) possible utility is 283.2
and 371.5 for the seller and buyer, respectively. These estimated utility values
produce the utility space shown in Figure 5.17. The figure also identifies the Nash
Bargaining solution (NBS) and the solution line.8
The last thing left for the protocol module to do in order to choose an agenda
for the negotiations is to compare all the possible agendas and see which one has
the best quality measurement. To make things simpler, we are going to just choose
two agendas and compare them in the same manner the protocol module would.
8The Nash Bargaining solution is determined by finding the point on the efficient frontier that

















Figure 5.18: The utility spaces for the two agendas A1 and A2, with the stage utility
frontiers shown. The solution line is also plotted along with the desired solution in
the first stage, which is the intersection of the solution line with the first stage utility
frontier.
The two agendas we are going to look at are: A1 = ({I2, I3}, {I1, I4}) and A2 =
({I1, I3}, {I2, I4}). Figure 5.18 shows these two agendas represented in utility space
along with the solution line in each of them. The intersection of the solution line
with the stage frontiers are marked showing where the desired solutions exist.
Before we compare the agendas, we should notice that the second stage is the
same for both agendas in terms of the utility space (because the second stage
comprises the entire utility space). This means all the calculations for that stage
between the two agendas is the same, so we need only worry about the calculations
in the first stage. This is similar to the agenda example in Section 5.4.3.
In order to compare the two agendas to see which is superior (according to our
measures), we need to determine the expected solutions in the first stage of the
agendas. We will need to plot where the initial agreement places us within the first
stage’s utility space. This is accomplished by calculating how much utility each
agent receives in the first stage from the initial agreement; essentially we calculate
the utility for each agent according to Definition 7 (on page 48), but restrict the
calculation to the issues in the first stage. In place of the actual valuation and
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reservation price, we use our estimated valuation and the boundaries of the trade
balance as substitutes, respectively. Letting the perceived trade balance on issue















Recall that the initial agreement is {p1 = 54, p2 = 30.5, p3 = 31.65, p4 = 39.49}.
Then the utility for each agent for agenda A1 is:
(seller)usA1 = λ
s′










And the utility for each agent for agenda A2 is:
(seller)usA2 = λ
s′










If we plot the stage1 initial agreement utility points within our utility spaces
(Figure 5.19), we see how the initial agreement restricts the agents to a subspace of
the stage1 utility space. Figure 5.19 also shows where the expected solutions exist
for these subspaces, which is just the NBS calculated for the restricted subspaces.
Now that we have the expected and desired solutions, we can calculate the agenda
quality measure (Definition 12 on page 77) that depends on the distance between
these two types of solutions.
For the first stage of agenda A1, the expected solution is (96.19, 103.05) and the
desired solution is (70.95, 123.27). This means the agenda quality measure for the
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first stage of agenda A1 (the distance between the expected and desired solution)
is 28.75.
For the first stage of agenda A2, the expected solution is (108.05, 38.57) and the
desired solution is (47.82, 83.08). This means the agenda quality measure for the
first stage of agenda A2 is 74.90.
Remember that we only need to compare the agenda quality measures of the
two agendas for the first stage because all stages after the first are the same in
the agenda. We can see that Q(A1) = 28.75 < 74.90 = Q(A2). Since we want to
minimise Q, this tells us that agenda A1 is better than agenda A2. Therefore, our
mediator will choose agenda A1 in the protocol module.
Our mediator process is now finished with its part in the negotiations, having
chosen an initial agreement ({p1 = 54, p2 = 30.5, p3 = 31.65, p4 = 39.49}) and
an agenda for the agents to use (A1 = ({I2, I3}, {I1, I4})). The agents will now
negotiate starting with our initial agreement and following the agenda we provided





















Figure 5.19: Showing the subspaces in the first stage of each of the two agendas, A1 and
A2, that agents are constrained to due to the initial agreement. We also see where the
expected agreements for each agenda are, being the Nash Bargaining solution of these
restricted subspaces. Intuitively, we can see that the expected and desired solutions for
the first stage are much closer together in agenda A1 than they are in agenda A2. This




The BAM framework was built with the intention of assisting agents to achieve
efficient and fair agreements in incomplete information scenarios. In particular, our
mediator’s purpose was to steer agents away from adversarial and selfish thinking
that may let agents lose sight of joint gains. However, the BAM framework cannot
do anything that the agents could not do for themselves, but as a third-party it
changes the negotiation environment in ways the agents are unlikely to do them-
selves. The framework changes what agents pay attention to and focuses them on
joint efforts. By using an incremental agreement process, the framework shifts at-
tention from developing individually created partisan offers to a common agreement
developed mutually. Instead of agents having to bring their partisan offers down to
a level acceptable to the other agent, now they are focused on improving a single
agreement for both agents; after all, both agents need to agree to any changes to
the common agreement so there must always been benefits for both agents in any
update to the common agreement. In the same spirit, our mediator provided an
agenda that keeps agents focused on solution subspaces that work well for both
agents and represent efficient areas of the utility space.
In order to help the agents, our mediator not only had to understand nego-
tiations, but additionally had to get the agents to trust it. We saw this in the
arbitration module were the mechanisms strived for incentive compatibility and in-
dividual rationality. The mediator we created had the arbitration module focus on
guaranteeing properties to make the agents want to participate, without worrying
too much about overall efficiency. Then the protocol module took over and led
agents through the solution space in a manner that was centred on wringing out as
much efficiency as possible, while paying attention to fairness too. This was how
our particular mediator delegated its overall goals into tasks within the modules,
but the framework can support mediators with different methodologies structured
within the arbitration and protocol modules.
The nice thing about having these separate modules is that they allow a “plug-
and-play” incremental development. For example, if we came up with a way to
create agendas that could guarantee fair pareto optimal outcomes, we good just
plug this new algorithm into the protocol module without having to change the
arbitration module. The inspiration for this separation of the mediator into modules
is due to the fact that incomplete information negotiations can be difficult and
may benefit from having multiple approaches to progressively tackle the problem;
multiple modules encourages this hybrid approach to problem solving.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Setup and Results
In order to examine the BAM framework more thoroughly, we have implemented
a simulation environment from the framework. The simulation framework imple-
ments the version of the BAM framework as described in the instantiation detailed
in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
In Section 6.1, we discuss how data was setup for the experiment and the pa-
rameters of the negotiation procedure used. Section 6.2 describes the agents that
participated in testing the framework and the behaviour they used during nego-
tiation. Section 6.3 discusses the metrics we recorded during simulation and the
specific results of our simulation trials. Lastly, we discuss the results of our exper-
iment in Section 6.4.
6.1 Negotiation Details
The following sections describe the parameters and process of a single negotiation
between two agents, which constitutes a single trial in our experiment.
6.1.1 Issue Setup
For each individual negotiation, ten issues were randomly generated based on a set
of parameters that described each aspect of the issues. All the issues were generated
using the same parameters and ranges. The generation properties were:
• The price range for each issue was from [0, 100].
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• The high end of the seller’s reservation price range was randomly chosen
within the range [10, 55]. So the seller’s reservation price range would be
[0, x], where 10 ≤ x ≤ 55.
• The low end of the buyer’s reservation price range was randomly chosen within
the range [45, 90]. So the buyer’s reservation price range would be [y, 100],
where 45 ≤ y ≤ 100.
• The agents’ actual reservation values were randomly chosen within the reser-
vation price ranges generated.
• Each agent also had a random valuation range generated for them which was
a subset of the range [1, 20].
• The agents’ actual valuations for the issues were randomly drawn from their
valuation ranges.
As can be seen, there was no particular bias towards either agent; the ranges
chosen are mirrored identically. In future work, it may be useful to run experiments
in more asymmetric settings to compare with our experiments here.
6.1.2 Agenda Setup
The agendas generated for our negotiations used a fixed stage size of two issues per
stage. With ten issues total, this means all our agendas are going to be five stage
agendas. This can be somewhat limiting, as variable stage sizes would allow for
the best tradeoffs amongst issues and probably the highest ability to guide agents
more precisely through the solution space. Again, these are options to consider in
future explorations of the framework.
6.1.3 Offer Procedure
The offer procedure defines the heart of a negotiation procedure, since a negotiation
is just a compilation of offers and their resolutions. Our particular offer procedure
is similar to the Rubinstein / St̊ahl alternating offers model (Section 2.4.4), but
differs from it in that we choose an agent to make an offer randomly and instead of
a discount factor we use an exogenous probability of breakdown. If the negotiation
breaks down, then agents have to accept the current agreement, which is the initial
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agreement plus any modifications to it that have been already been agreed upon.
This negotiation procedure is the one used by John and Raith [11, 12].
The probability of choosing the seller as the offerer, P , was equal to 0.5, so
each agent was equally likely to be the offerer at each time step. The exogenous
probability of breakdown, 1 − δ, is implemented as a chance of breakdown that
occurs before every offer is made. In our particular experiment, 1 − δ = 0.04, or
4%. The result of using this offer procedure is that every single offer in a given stage
has the exact same analysis illustrated by Figure 6.1. This means we do not have
to resort to the backwards induction used in the alternating offers model (Section
2.4.4) when discussing rationality, but instead just consider the amount of utility
each agent expects to get based on the probabilities of being chosen as the offerer
and of exogenous breakdown.
The expectations of each agent are:
usb = δ[Pu
s
s + (1− P )usb] + (1− δ)us0 (6.1)
ubs = δ[Pu
b
s + (1− P )ubb] + (1− δ)ub0 (6.2)
Subscripts in the above equations indicate the identity of the offerer, superscripts
indicate the recipient of the utility. The interpretation of something like usb then
means, the amount of utility the seller would receive from the buyer’s offer. The
subscript 0 indicates the “offerer” is the initial agreement. To fully understand the
equations, let us dissect Equation 6.1.
Puss is the probability of the seller being chosen multiplied by the utility the seller
would receive if it were to make an offer
(1− P )usb is the probability of the buyer being chosen multiplied by the utility the
seller would receive if the buyer were to make an offer
Puss + (1− P )usb is the expected utility the seller would receive if exogenous break-
down does not occur
us0 is the utility the seller receives from the initial agreement for the stage
Therefore Equation 6.1 becomes the utility the seller expects overall based on
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Figure 6.1: The diagram illustrates how a single offer in the negotiation procedure
works. The top two nodes in the diagram start the offer and represent random elements
in the offer, so the actor for these nodes can be considered to be Nature. First, before
anything else, there is a 1 − δ probability of exogenous breakdown. Then an agent is
randomly chosen to make an offer to the other agent. If the offer is accepted, then
we move on to the next stage were the same procedure is followed. If the offer is
rejected we run through this exact same procedure within the same stage starting with
the chance of exogenous breakdown.
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6.2 Agents
The agents used in our simulation experiments and their behaviour are described
below:
Default Agent This agent accepts any agreement, no matter how bad it is, and
offers the stage’s initial agreement as its offer.
Smart Default Agent This agent accepts any agreement that gives it at least
as much utility as the stage’s initial agreement and makes offers that give it
very nominal utility increases (i.e. a 5% increase in utility over the initial
agreement).
Typical Agent This agent starts out with a high desired utility which guides its
offers and acceptance behaviour, but as the stage continues without successful
offers, this agent will lower its desired utility all the way down to accepting
the initial agreement for the stage. Additionally, this agent maintains an
automatic acceptance utility level that is lower than its desired utility level,
but it will accept any agreement offered that gives it that much utility. The
idea is that the agent believes that this amount is better than it can honestly
expect, even if it is not as much as it desires at the moment.
For example, at the start of a stage, a Typical Agent might initially want 80%
of its maximum possible increase in utility, with an automatic acceptance
utility of 50% of its maximum possible increase in utility. With each offer
that goes unaccepted (by either agent), the agent lowers its desired amount
by between 10%-20%. It will keep doing this until an agreement is accepted
or it has bottomed out and is willing to accept the same utility as offered by
the initial agreement (to try and prevent exogenous breakdown occurring).
6.3 Results
We ran our negotiation experiment with each possible pairing of agent types, first
running 1000 trials, then switching the agent’s identities (as the buyer and seller)
and then running another 1000 trials. The results that appear below are the aver-
ages over these 2000 trials per agent pairing.
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6.3.1 Metrics
We consider the following metrics in evaluating the trials in our experiment:
M1. The utility received by each agent as a percentage of its maximum possible
utility. The maximum possible utility is not realistically possible in a negoti-
ation, however, because it would require the other agent to give in completely
on every issue. This is just used as one measure that can compare the differ-
ences between different agent type pairings.
M2. The utility received by each agent as a percentage of its utility if the Nash
Bargaining Solution had been achieved. The NBS in this situation represents
an ideal solution, although it is possible for an agent to receive more than
it would in the NBS at the expense of the other agent. This measure can
be used more successfully as an efficiency measure, as well as a measure of
how well our system estimated the NBS with incomplete information to work
from.
M3. The utility received by each agent as a percentage increase over the utility
of the initial agreement proposed by the mediator. This allows us to see if
agents actually negotiated a better deal than what they started with.
M4. The exogenous failure rate between different pairs of agents. This measure
allows us to see if agents had difficulty reaching an agreement since a higher
failure rate will generally indicate longer negotiating times.
M5. The average stage reached in negotiations between a pair of agents. This is a
measure of how long negotiations were and how close agents came to reaching
a successful agreement in the case of exogenous failure.
M6. The average utility received for negotiations, separated into categories ac-
cording to the stage reached in the negotiations. This measure will allow us
to see how negotiations improve as agents move further through the agenda.
6.3.2 Data
The first metric we consider are the failure rates for different agent pairings. The
failure rate is just the percentage of the negotiation trials that resulted in exoge-
nous breakdown (any trial that was successful meant that the agents managed to
negotiate through the entire agenda). Table 6.1 shows the failure rates amongst
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different agent pairings. Note that the table should be symmetric, which is why
some entries are not listed.
default smart default typical
default 5.1 5.3 8.5
smart default - 98.5 35.5
typical - - 37.1
Table 6.1: Showing the various rates of failure for different agent pairings.
The low failure rates with the default agent are to be expected since it accepts
any offer proposed to it, and these failure rates form a baseline for the amount
of minimum failure that occurs due to exogenous causes. The typical agent has a
higher rate of failure, around the mid thirties, and this is due to the fact that these
agents take longer to negotiate stages and thus opens up the chance for exogenous
failure. The smart default agent negotiating with another smart default agent has
a startling high failure rate, almost failing at every opportunity! This is due to the
fact that these agents do not modify their offers as time goes by, instead stubbornly
sticking to them.
Related to the failure rates is the average stage reached for various pairings.
The average stage reached gives us an idea of how far through the agenda different
agent pairings got to. Table 6.2 displays this metric.
default smart default typical
default 4.849 4.843 4.7805
smart default - 1.058 3.917
typical - - 3.81
Table 6.2: Showing how far each agent pairing got in the agenda, on average. Note
that the agendas only had 5 stages, so this was the maximum possible value.
These values are generally what we would expect, especially considering the
failure rates above. The default agents almost always reach later stages in the
agenda since they are willing to accept anything and advance through the stages
quickly. Again, we see, as we start having more complicated agents playing against
each other, that they tend to take longer in their negotiations, and thus exogenous
breakdown becomes more likely. Again we see the difficulties the smart default



































Figure 6.2: The graph shows how well agents do compared to how far they get in the
agenda. The measurements represent the percentage increase in utility for the agents,
above that of what was provided by the initial agreement decided by the mediator. It
is clear the general trend is that agents get larger utility the further they go through
the agenda. This is natural since it means more issues have been negotiated and
more utility gains are possible to be found. The results here are averaged over all the
experimental trials we performed and just shows the average utility an agent can expect
if its negotiation only gets to a certain stage.
Next we show how well agents do the further they get in the agenda. In Figure
6.2, we find a graph illustrating how much agents bettered the initial agreement
based on how far they got through the agenda. This graph averages over all agent
pairings possible, and is used to show the general trend that as agents get further
through the agenda, they receive more utility.
We now focus a little more on the specific utility values agents achieved during
negotiations. Table 6.3 displays what percentage of the maximum utility each
agent received. The entries listed show what percentage of the maximum utility
the row agent received on average. Note that these values appear very low since
the maximum utility achievable is not realistically achievable at all, since it would
require one agent to basically give in completely on every possible issue.
We see that except for when playing against the default agent, there is very
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default smart default typical
default 40.2 38.4 28.0
smart default 43.0 41.0 41.2
typical 54.9 41.7 41.2
Table 6.3: This table lists the percentage of the maximum possible utility each agent
received as an average over all the trials. The entries list these values for the row agent.
little movement towards the Nash bargaining solution in any of the agent pairing
when compared to the baseline value of the top left entry.
The next measurement (Table 6.4) compares the agents’ utilities received to
the Nash Bargaining Solution, which is our desired solution. The values shown
represent the percentage of the NBS utility that the row agent received, meaning
if an entry says 78.5, then the row agent for that entry received 78.5% of its NBS
utility. The entry for the default agent paired with the default agent acts as the
baseline for the other values, since that entry represents where the initial agreement
is with respect to the NBS.
default smart default typical
default 77.0 73.8 53.5
smart default 82.8 78.5 79.7
typical 105.2 79.9 79.1
Table 6.4: This table lists the percentage of the Nash Bargaining Solution utility each
agent received as an average over all the trials. The entries list these values for the row
agent.
Again, we do not see a lot of improvement on the baseline entry for the default
agent paired with another default agent, except in the case of the typical agent
taking advantage of the default agent.
The last measurement shows how much improvement agents made over the
initial agreement in terms of utility; it is expressed as the percentage of improvement
over the initial agreement. This is shown in Table 6.5, and again the entries are
listed for the row agent only.
Again, we see a similar trend of exploitation of the default agent by the typical
agent, but when paired against the smart default agent or another typical agent,
the improvements over the initial agreement are much more modest.
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default smart default typical
default 0 -4.55 -30.12
smart default 7.26 2.02 2.04
typical 39.2173 5.48 2.74
Table 6.5: This table lists the percentage improvement agents made over the utility
they received in the initial agreement laid out by the mediator. The entries list these
values for the row agent.
6.4 Discussion
As we saw in the last section, the experiments showed that little improvement
is being made beyond the initial agreement that was provided by the mediator.
One positive aspect to this is that the initial agreement brings agents up to a
level of utility that provides them with a solid basis agreement. However, agents
were having difficulty obtaining utility beyond this point except in situations of
exploitation resulting from very unevenly matched agents.
The philosophy of our mediation framework is to encourage agents to explore
areas of joint gain based on where they were being directed by the initial agreement
and agenda. The failure of this to happen is believed to be due to two things: we
have not yet examined enough agents with different search behaviour, and the
implementation details of how offers are created might not be explorative enough
of the solution space.
In order to simplify the simulation framework, the way offers were generated
may have not focused enough on both agents, but only on the agent making the
offer. In this way, desired utility increases in offers may not have been well-balanced
enough and the concessions made to entice the other agent may not have been strong
enough to allow agreements to be made early on; this would have resulted in offers
having to be pulled back significantly to achieve agreement and opened up the
possibility of exogenous breakdowns. In particular, the typical agent initially made
offers close to the efficient frontier, but then scaled back away from the frontier
almost to the point of the initial agreement in order to reach an agreement. This
is why the typical agent’s gains, while they are positive, are fairly small.
In future work we will have to explore offer creation and agreement behaviour
that focuses more on starting from the initial agreement and moving towards the
frontier, especially considering this is what our framework would seem to suggest
is the best behaviour to follow. Unfortunately, advancements in this direction
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are still swimming against the tide of incomplete information, as agents still have
little idea of the preferences of the other agent. It may be useful to explore using





Extensions of the System
This chapter is our future work section where we explore various extensions to
the BAM framework including updates to the Greedy Punishment Solution, the
valuation chips mechanism, and agendas.
7.1 Randomised Revelation Process
The Greedy Punishment Solution (GPS) of Section 5.3.1 guaranteed one-sided IC,
but gave us little information about the actual reservation prices (RP) of the agents.
It was essentially a declaration, under duress, from the agents that they will allow
the mediator maximum flexibility on issue pricing by declaring the weakest RP
value. Figure 7.1 reminds us of the definitions of weakest and strongest RP values.
It would be desirable to have a mechanism that obtains more information than
the GPS, even though Myerson and Satterthwaite (Theorem 1) suggest we will not
be able to obtain everything in an incomplete information scenario. But perhaps
it is possible to obtain more than what we have now, but short of everything we
desire. The method proposed here utilises randomisation in the hopes of achieving
desirable goals in expectation: we would like agents to be truthful in general.
7.1.1 The Method
Imagine each declaration an agent makes for each issue is considered an object:
for every issue we have two objects, one declaration for the seller and one for the
buyer (Figure 7.2). Then for n issues, we have 2n declaration objects (Figure 7.3).
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Figure 7.1: An issue showing the RP ranges of the agents and the weakest and strongest
declarations of the agents.
Each declaration object represents the RP range of the agent it belongs to and the
line within the rectangle represents where the agent’s declaration occurs within this
range.
The Randomised Revelation method takes the declaration objects and randomly
pairs them together under two types of pairing relationships: intra-agent and inter-
agent. Intra-agent pairings pair declarations from the same agent together, whereas
inter-agent pairings form pairs between declarations from the two agents. Every
declaration object will participate in one inter-agent pairing and one intra-agent
pairing (If there are an odd number of issues, then one declaration from each agent
will not be part of an intra-agent pairing). A full set of both pairings are illustrated
in Figure 7.4.
The Meaning of Intra-agent Pairings
When two declarations from the same agent are paired, we randomly choose one of
these declarations that we will “believe” and the other that we will not believe.1 The
meaning of belief is that we will generally accept believed declarations as truthful.
This will be explained in more detail when we discuss inter-agent pairings.
The reason for random intra-agent pairs is to make the agents uncertain which
declarations will be believed by the mediator and which will not be believed. The
agents will know that approximately half of their declarations will be believed
and half will not, but the placement of declarations into these two groups will be
unknown to the agents when the declarations are made. This uncertainty about
1If there is an unpaired declaration for each agent, we randomly choose to believe or disbelieve
both of them.
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Figure 7.2: The derivation of declaration objects from an issue. Each declaration
represents the agents’ RP ranges and the lines within this range are the declarations
they made to the mediator. (a) An example of deriving the declaration objects from an




















Seller’s Declarations Buyer’s Declarations
Figure 7.3: An example of the declaration objects for all n issues. Remember each
object represents the RP range of the agent it belongs to, and the line within is where
the agents declaration within this range occurred.







Figure 7.4: An example of pairings between declaration objects. Notice the declaration
objects that are starred. Since the number of issues is odd, these are the randomly







Figure 7.5: An example illustrating basic inter-agent pairing. In this case the seller
is going to be punished on issue I1 by the difference of the two agents’ greed, 25%.
The punishment is translated into lowering the default price on issue I1 in the initial
agreement.
which declarations will be believed makes it more difficult for agents to exploit a
mechanism that uses these types of pairings.
The Meaning of Inter-agent Pairings
When two declarations from different agents are paired, this puts the two declara-
tions into a game similar to that of the GPS mechanism. The general idea is that
the mediator looks at the level of “greediness” (see Definition 8) in each declaration
and favours the less greedy agent by performing price adjustments on the issues
represented by these declarations. For the rest of the chapter we will refer to an
agent’s level of greediness on an issue as how far away its actual declaration of
its reservation price is from its weakest declaration, as a percentage of its entire
reservation price range (in Figure 7.5 the level of greediness is shown as the shaded
part of the RP range, making the declaration on the left 50% greedy and the one
on the right 25% greedy).
For example, consider Figure 7.5, here we have a seller declaration for issue I1
that is 50% greedy and a buyer declaration for issue I8 that is 25% greedy. In this
case, the mediator will punish the seller by the difference of the greediness, 25%,
on issue I1 (recall that this means the price on issue I1 will be lowered by 25% of
the seller’s share of the trade balance). Note that every issue has two declarations
associated with it, one from each agent, and so the single inter-agent pairing in this
example does not fully define the price adjustments on issues I1 and I8.
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The example shows that inter-agent pairings, as described so far, are very sim-
ilar to the GPS mechanism. In fact, if declarations for the same issue were paired
together, this would result in the original GPS mechanism as described in Chap-
ter 5. The point of not doing this, but instead randomly choosing the inter-agent
pairings is to reduce the strategic advantage of knowledge of the other agent when
making declarations; we would like agents’ declarations to not be based upon their
counterparts, but instead on their own reservation prices. If an agent knows the
importance of an issue to the other agent, this may affect the agent’s own declara-
tion on that issue. But if the agent does not know which issue its declaration will
be paired with, it cannot take advantage of this knowledge and may be better off
just not being greedy as in the GPS.
Agents not being greedy at all is no good, however. This was why the GPS
solution did not provide any useful information in the first place, because the agents
had no incentive to declare anything but their weakest position. We want agents
to be greedy sometimes, to reflect their actual RP values. This is where belief from
the intra-agent pairings will come into play; it will be used as a way to provide
rewards to the agents as a counterbalance to the existing punishments. This will
lead to agents having to strike a balance between modesty and opportunism that
will lead to declarations that are neither very weak nor very strong.
Combining the Pairings
Once the pairings are combined, there are four possible inter-agent pairings as
shown in Table 7.1. All that needs to be decided is how each of these possibilities
are to be handled. In the case of NB-NB, where neither agent is believed, nothing
needs to be done; the current GPS like solution will suffice where the more greedy
agent is punished by the difference of the amounts of greediness. The remaining
symmetric case (B-B) and the two asymmetric cases need to be handled differently
since belief is now involved in these pairings, and as mentioned earlier, this belief
factor needs to factor into the ability to be rewarded.
The symmetric case of belief (B-B) is problematic since each agent should be
believed, and it seems unfair to adjust the prices since any adjustment of prices
counts as a punishment towards one agent. In this case, it is best to do nothing at
all and leave the prices as they are with respect to these declarations. If we handle
the symmetric cases as mentioned, then there is still no incentive for an agent to
declare anything but its weakest declaration since no rewards are provided; rewards
will have to be encapsulated in the asymmetric cases then.
The simplest way to reward an agent in the asymmetric case is to just reward
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Table 7.1: The possible pairings of belief types in the inter-agent pairing of declarations.








Figure 7.6: An example for illustrating how rewards might work. In this pairing the
seller is not believed and the buyer is believed, the buyer will be rewarded on issue I5 by
its level of greed, 80%. No price adjustment will be made on issue I2, however, observe
that a reward for the buyer on issue I5 is a punishment for the seller.
them the amount of their greed on the declaration issue. For example, in Figure
7.6, the buyer is believed for its issue I5 declaration and has been 80% greedy so
we will adjust the price on I5 in favour of the buyer by 80% (which is actually the
same as punishing the seller on issue I5 if the seller had made a declaration that
was 80% greedy). Doing this, agents will now have an incentive to declare strong
reservation prices in addition to weak ones.
7.1.2 Questions
Now that we have explained the approach of this randomised method, it will be
helpful to answer a few questions to understand how this method is different from
the GPS and how it brings us closer to obtaining better information about the
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agents’ reservation prices.
Why won’t agents always declare their weakest reservation price?
Without loss of generality, say the seller declares its weakest price on every issue.
Now, all the buyer has to do is declare something a little stronger than its weakest
price on every issue and it should come out ahead. After all, the way the punish-
ments are meted out, the buyer will only suffer on 1
4
of the issues, but will gain or
do the same on 3
4
of the issues. If the buyer makes its declarations appropriately,
it should expect to gain utility a majority of the time.
Each agent acts as the baseline for the other agent; an agent is only considered
greedy if it is more greedy than the other agent. This was true in the GPS as well,
but the difference here is that agents can gain a reward for being greedy, this was
not true of the GPS. An agent can benefit by just being a little more greedy than
the other agent, so neither agent will want to declare too weakly anymore, but at
the same time they do not know how strongly to declare either.
Why won’t agents always declare their strongest reservation price?
The answer to this question is similar to the last question. Say the seller declares
its strongest price on every issue, then the buyer can declare prices that are just
slightly more modest (weaker) without having to worry about punishment since no
matter what the inter-agent pairings are, the seller will always be greedier and thus
be the one punished in (NB-NB) situations. So the buyer could enjoy large gains
when it is believed without any risk when it is not believed.
Again, each agent is the baseline for the other agent, and the best strategy is to
exhibit the same level of greediness as the other agent, although there are benefits
to being just above and just below the other agent’s level of greediness. However,
it will not necessarily be known to either agent how greedy the other agent is in
general, and specific levels of greediness on particular issues (i.e. if an issue is known
to be important it may cause higher or lower levels of greed) are complicated by
the randomised pairing of declarations.
7.1.3 Conclusion
The randomised method presented here should be an improvement on the GPS
solution we have been using, providing more information about the agents’ private
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information. There is a balancing act introduced where each agent wants to be
about as greedy as the other agent and now there is incentive to not be too greedy
or too modest. Whether these incentives can be aligned with the actual reservation
prices still needs to be determined. These ideas are preliminary, but the hope is
that some randomised mechanism like the one here can be used to allow an agent
to be truthful and still do well in expectation.
The idea is similar to having a balanced stock portfolio: some stocks will go
up and some down, but overall a gain is experienced. This approach can be rather
complicated, since we are randomising the pairings and since the agents do not
know how they will be paired, they need to balance out their declarations between
opportunism and honesty in order to maintain a balanced portfolio of declarations
(i.e. they will stand to lose on some issues and gain on others). Due to this
randomness, in expectation an agent is better off just telling the truth, or at least
telling the truth is an easy option computationally that is not detrimental in general.
From this viewpoint, there is hope that we can have more confidence trusting the
agents.
7.2 Valuation Chips Improvements
The valuation chips mechanism (Section 5.3.2) being used currently provides an
ordering of agents’ preferences for issues with respect to their valuations. The
ultimate goal is to not only acquire this ranking but to obtain a representation of
the actual valuations agents have for the issues. This requires knowing how much
more important one issue is over another issue. But since the value of the chips are
fixed, it is not possible for agents to inform the mechanism beyond just a ranking
of the issues. Clearly, some variable value mechanism is needed where the agents
themselves assign points to each issue based on their private valuations. In fact,
this was the original approach to this problem.
A näıve point system, that has no restrictions on how points can be assigned,
reveals little useful information. If a maximum number of points per issue is set,
then this will reveal a group of issues that is more important than the group of
issues that have no points assigned to them. For example, if the agents are given
450 points and a 100 points/issue limit, then each agent will assign 100 points
to each of its top four issues and 50 points to its fifth most important issue (see
Figure 7.7). All this reveals is the top four issues for an agent (without any ordering
information amongst these four issues) as well as specific identification of the fifth












5th most important issue
Issues not in the top 5
Figure 7.7: An agent is given 450 points to distribute with a 100 points/issue maximum.
The result will be that 100 points are assigned to each of the top five issues, 50 points
to the fifth most important issue, and no points to any other issue. This provides very
little information except the identity of the fifth most important issue for the agent.
except that they are not in the top five important issues for an agent. Obviously,
a better set of restrictions is needed.
In our example, the fifth most important issue was identified and this shows
how to obtain rankings amongst the issues: put different maximum point limits on
the issues. The way this would work would be to allow a maximum of, say, 100
points on only one issue, then 80 points maximum on another issue, then 60 on
one other issue, and so on, providing the agent enough points that it can max out
each of these limits. The rational agent behaviour in this case would be to put 100
points on its most important issue, 80 points on its second most important, 60 on
its third most important, and so on, following the point maximums per issue as
they descend. This will give an agent’s preference ordering on the issues, and this
is exactly our current valuation chips mechanism!
To obtain more information, further modifications to the point system need to
be made. The obvious extension is to create a mechanism that uses the separation
in assigned points of issues to alter the issues’ prices in the initial agreement. It is
not clear at the moment if this will be possible while balancing out the workings of
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the existing mechanism; further study is needed. However, what appears needed is
some mechanism that effectively redistributes the assigned points (after they have
been assigned by the agents) based on the point separation of issues.
7.3 Agendas
The agenda process we dealt with in Section 5.4 was relatively uncomplicated over-
all, but it illustrated a novel general method for choosing an agenda in a geometric
manner for an incomplete information environment. However, the method we intro-
duced can be made more complicated in order to address a greater range of criteria
and situations. A more comprehensive set of quality measures are introduced in
Section 7.3.1 and a further extension of agenda ideas in general is introduced in
Section 7.3.2.
7.3.1 Comprehensive Quality Measures: DRAB
The DRAB quality measures are essentially an expansion of the simple distance
measure we used in Section 5.4.3. DRAB is an acronym for Distance, Risk, Asym-
metry, and Balance; four different metrics for evaluating an agenda. These various
metrics are discussed below, but the idea would be to extend our quality measure
for an agenda so that it is a weighted sum of these four metrics. Each of the in-
dividual metrics could be specialised to ascertain different desirable properties of
an agenda, and the weighting could be used to decide how important each type of
measurement is to the overall goal for the agenda.
Definition 13 (DRAB Agenda Quality Measure) The expanded agenda qual-
ity measure, Q, for an agenda, A, is
Q(A) = wDD(A) + wRR(A) + wAsymAsym(A) + wBB(A)
where wD + wR + wAsym + wB = 1 and
wD, wR, wAsym, wB ≥ 0
D, R, Asym, and B are individual measures that rate the quality of an agenda on
different properties and are weighted by the w values.
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By making the quality measure more complex, the amount of computation
time for performing an agenda assessment will likely increase significantly since the
current basic distance measure (see Section 5.4.3 and Definition 12) is composed
mostly of simple constant time computations. For more information about how
much computation this might be with respect to how many agendas need to be
evaluated, see Appendix A.
The quality measure functions used in Definition 13 are not actually specified in
this section, but are descriptions of what the measures might be with respect to the
goals of each measure as described below. Before going into this description though,
it is helpful to consider the different classifications of agenda measurements.
Agenda quality measures can be classified into three general categories: stage
dependent, agent dependent, and agenda dependent. Stage dependent measures
focus on taking a measurement from the properties of individual stages; these stage
measurements may be aggregated together to form the overall measurement, but the
specific measurements focus mainly on single stages. Agent dependent measures are
those that take into account elements of the agents’ preferences, for example, their
preference orderings. Agenda dependent measures are those that require looking
at the entire agenda to make a measurement. This differs from aggregated stage
dependent measures because a stage dependent measure can be made within a stage
and still have meaning, whereas an agenda dependent measure has to consider
trends across the entire agenda in order to make an assessment; a single stage
provides little or no information to an agenda dependent measure. Many of the
DRAB measures combine elements of some or all of the three classifications.
Distance (D)
Distance is the measure that is already being used in Section 5.4.3 that measures
the distance between the expected solution (Definition 11) and the desired solution
(Definition 10) in a stage. This measure is stage dependent.
Risk (R)
The risk measure is meant to assess qualities of an agenda that will make a nego-
tiation more likely to breakdown. Besides measuring individual high risk aspects
of an agenda, the measure also evaluates risk as a composite property over the en-
tire agenda. In particular, as risk decreases as agents proceed through the agenda,
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their expected utilities increase.2 Risk can be a complicated measure that con-
siders many facets of an agenda and thus falls into all three categories of quality
measures; risk is stage, agent, and agenda dependent. First we discuss stage depen-
dent measurements and then move on to measurements that are agent and agenda
dependent.
There are two forms of breakdown that we focus on in this work: endogenous and
exogenous. Endogenous breakdown occurs if agents just cannot reach an agreement
at some point in negotiations for whatever reason. The likelihood of this occurring
increases when agents are too far apart to make a compromise or when things
become too confusing to realise there is a compromise. If the former case is true,
there is little that we can do as a mediator to relieve the situation, but if the
latter is a problem, we may be able to arrange the agenda to be less complicated.
Exogenous breakdown occurs due to factors that are outside of the negotiation that
result in its deterioration, although these factors may be affected by events within
the negotiation. For example, many outside factors put pressure on a negotiation
the longer the negotiation continues without an agreement. This is seen in many
labour disputes that become more bitter and polarising as the length of the dispute
increases. It is difficult to know, in general, what these outside factors may be;
however, it is likely that exacerbation can be avoided by reducing the length of
negotiation.
Assessing risk then becomes a measurement of an agenda’s contribution to the
length and complexity of a negotiation. Fortunately, both of these things can
generally be assessed by examining the size of the stages in the agenda. The size
of a stage can be measured by how much utility it represents or how many issues
are involved (or both). A large stage size increases the likelihood that that stage
will be difficult to negotiate because there is a lot involved in that stage, making
it harder for agents to determine a compromise and to do so in a timely manner.3
The actual measurement of stage size can count the number of issues and might,
for example, measure utility by looking at the distance between efficient frontiers
of the stages in the agenda (see Figure 7.8).
To increase the quality of an agenda, risk should go down as the agenda pro-
gresses. This can be measured by taking the risk measurements just discussed
and giving some weight to how well these measurements decrease from the early
stages to the later stages. However, there are other considerations that need to
2The ramifications of risk over time within agendas is studied by John and Raith in an envi-
ronment similar to the one we use [11, 12].
3In complete information scenarios, this is generally not true unless dealing with bounded




Figure 7.8: An example of how the utility size of an agenda may be measured. Some
distance measure between frontiers in the stages of the agenda assesses how much
utility there is per stage. A measure like this combines both agents’ utility sizes into
one measurement.
be balanced into the overall risk measurement that can be at odds with the spe-
cific measurements mentioned thus far. The model of negotiation we use says that
agents can reach incremental agreements through the stages of the agenda, build-
ing more and more utility into the current default agreement at each successfully
negotiated stage. In light of this, risk is considered to decrease over time as more
and more utility is incorporated into the current agreement, since that means there
is less and less utility to be lost due to breakdown. This is contradictory to the
measures discussed thus far because it implies having large stage sizes early in the
agenda; a balance must be found between these two ideas.
The latter viewpoint of measuring risk over time, motivates the idea that large
non-contentious issues should occur early in the agenda, while small contentious
issues occur later on. This way, it is more likely that large amounts of utility are
easily secured within the current agreement as quickly as possible. The size of an
issue can be estimated by the issue orderings of the agents and the surplus size on
the issue (as we did in Section 5.4.1 when we needed to convert issues into utility
space). The level of contention can be measured by how evenly agents measure
an issue: if both agents think the issue is of similar importance in terms of issue
ordering then the contention is higher (see Figure 7.9). This idea of contention is













Figure 7.9: Examples of issues that are contentious and not very contentious. Issues
are represented by the rectangles and the numbers on each side represent the issue
ranking for each of the agents. Contention is measure by how similar the agents rank
an issue in their issue orderings that are derived from the Valuation Chips mechanism




When agents negotiate within a stage, it is desirable that each agent have something
more desirable to the other agent than what the other agent currently has. When
this happens, trade-offs are much easier because it is clear that the agents want to
trade their share in an issue they do not care that much about for a larger share in
an issue that they do care a lot about (see Figure 7.10). Typically, when the initial
agreement is created for the agents, each agent gets a share of each issue as we try
to distribute the trade balance on that issue. In other words, each agent is given a
stake in every issue, including issues that the other agent cares more about.
The main concern of issue asymmetry is measuring the amount by which agents
value issues differently within a stage. To measure this, one can sum the difference
in issue ranking for each issue in a stage (taken from the issue orderings from
the Valuation Chips mechanism in the arbitration module). The average issue
asymmetry over all the stages in the agenda can then be used as the issue asymmetry
measurement for the agenda. Issue asymmetry is both a stage and agent dependent
measure.
See Figure 7.11 for an example of how to calculate this measure for an agenda.












Figure 7.10: An example of trade-offs within a stage. The numbers on the sides
represent the rankings in importance of the issues, with low numbers meaning higher
importance. If these issues represent a stage in the agenda, then the seller wants to
use any share it has in the Issue 1 (which the seller does not care about) as leverage
to get a larger share in Issues 2 and 3. This may be possible since the buyer does not
care too much about these issues, but values Issue 1 very highly.
Issue Balance (B)
Issue balance has a lot in common with issue asymmetry and might be combined
with the previous measure since their differences can be subtle. In issue asymmetry,
the focus was on how differently agents ranked the issues in a stage, but not actually
whether this asymmetry was balanced. That is, if all the issues in a stage where
actually valued higher by the buyer than the seller, this still gave a good asymmetry
score for that stage. But if this is the case, then the seller has no reason to budge
from the current agreement in that stage since the buyer has nothing the seller
wants. Thus in order to make negotiations proceed smoothly and have agents
capitalise on joint gains, it is desirable to have asymmetry but also to have a
balance between the asymmetry within a stage so that both agents have something
to offer.
Issue balance, then, is the measure of the balance of issues within a stage.
This can be measured similarly to asymmetry by looking at the difference between
rankings of the issues, but instead the signed difference is used. Summing these
signed differences of individual issue rankings within a stage means that a score
close to 0 is a good balance score for a stage. Taking the average of the absolute
values of these sums4 over all stages forms the overall balance score of the agenda
(see Figure 7.11 for an example of calculating the issue balance of an agenda).
Similar to asymmetry, issue balance is both a stage and agent dependent measure.
4If we just take the average of the signed sums over all stages, it will always be zero since the
sums will always add up to zero since each agent has the same set of rankings when we consider


































































Figure 7.11: An example of calculating issue asymmetry and balance. The nine issues
are separated into three stages, with the issues rankings for each agent shown on the
sides of the issues. The individual asymmetry and balance for each issue are shown
with stage totals shown just to the right of the issues. The overall agenda asymmetry
and balance are shown at the far right and are averages of the stage scores (except the
balance measure first takes the absolute value of the stage scores). A high asymmetry
score and a low balance score are desirable, however the particular scores shown have
no meaning until they are compared against other agendas.
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Note that a good balance score is achieved by asymmetric issues that “cancel”
each other out in terms of their direction of asymmetry, but also can be achieved
by sets of issues that are very symmetrical. Since the desire of the issue measures
is to create stages that give each agent something to offer the other agent, making
trading easier, it is necessary to have both good balance and good asymmetry
measures together to attain this goal.
7.3.2 Further Agenda Extensions
In the previous section we focused on extending our particular agenda creation
method, but here we introduce more general agenda extensions that can be used
with or without our framework. By adding dynamic elements to agendas, these ex-
tensions grant further levels of control to the mediator over the negotiation process
occurring in the Negotiation Module.
Blind Agendas
Normally, when the negotiation module begins both agents can see the entire agenda
that was created by the mediator, allowing agents to lookahead while planning their
stage negotiations. In blind agendas, the agents are only allowed to see the agenda
up to, and including, the current stage. This is a pseudo-dynamism because the
mediator cannot change the agenda once the negotiation module takes over. There
are probably lots of ways to use this, and we discuss a few here. However, the
appeal of blind agendas seems limited and the main reason for introducing it is for
motivation for the next two topics.
By not letting agents know how far away particular issues are, it makes it more
likely that agents need to “play nice” to get to unresolved issues that are important.
This is because they do not know when they will be negotiating these issues and do
not want negotiations to breakdown prematurely. In addition, a blind agenda also
focuses agents on the current stage, which may be useful to more limited agents
that may get ahead of themselves trying to plan according to the whole agenda.
Dynamic Agendas
Currently, once the negotiation module begins, the agenda is static and can no
longer be changed. This means that if the agents negotiate in such a way that the
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Figure 7.12: Updating Figure 5.2 with a feedback loop between the negotiation and
protocol module (highlighted in this figure), that allows the use of dynamic agendas.
Dynamic agendas allow modification of the agenda based on how the actual negotiations
proceed.
be desirable to change the agenda to reflect the actual behaviour of the agents as
they progress through the stages. A dynamic agenda creates a feedback loop from
the negotiation module to the protocol module (see Figure 7.12), that allows the
agenda to be changed dynamically based on the stage negotiations of the agents.
Obviously, only future stages can be modified in this way. Since future stages may
change, it may be best to also use a blind agenda approach so that agents are not
misled by seeing future stages that may not be used; effectively for the agents, a
dynamic agenda would appear the same as a blind agenda.
One way this technique can be used is for re-evaluating agendas after every
stage’s negotiations: the mediator recalculates the best agenda using the same cri-
teria but only assessing the agendas based on the stages that have not yet been
negotiated. In addition, the knowledge of the current agreement can be used in
place of the initial agreement that was used to create the original agenda, the cur-
rent agreement having the additional information of how agents negotiated all the
previous stages. Figure 7.13 gives an example of how using the current agreement
differs from using the initial agreement.
























Figure 7.13: (a) The expected solutions using a regular agenda. (b) The expected
solutions using a dynamic re-evaluation of the agenda to include the current agreement
after stage 1. Note that the space of viable solutions in the second stage is now smaller
than in part (a).
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much from the direction they should be traveling in the solution space, the agenda
can be modified to correct for this deviation. However, it may not always be
desirable to do this since this deviation may actually be the agents fitting the initial
agreement to be more accurately aligned with their true preferences (of which the
mediator is not privy to).
Agenda Trees
Agenda trees are a combination of both blind and dynamic agendas, but they are
combined in a way that allows static creation of the agenda tree such that a feedback
loop from the negotiation module is unnecessary. Static creation can be desirable
since it can be costly and lengthy to re-evaluate agendas while negotiations are
proceeding, causing delays in the negotiation process when the agents are involved.
The idea behind an agenda tree is to precalculate backup plans for when agents
deviate from following along the path we are trying to lead them. If agents gener-
ally follow the path that is considered desirable, then the original agenda is used
unaltered. But if agents stray too far off the path, then the current agenda is re-
placed with a different agenda that is more likely to help get agents back on track.
This is done by separating the solution space of each stage into different areas (the
shape of which are arbitrary and decided by the mediator framework), and for each
area assigning an agenda. If agents negotiating in that stage produce an agreement
within one of these areas, then the agenda associated with that area is used in the
next stage, this is illustrated in Figure 7.14.
Agenda trees actually do require information from the negotiation module, but
this information only needs to be used within the finite state machine that is the
agenda tree, and does not have to go back to the mediator framework for a decision
to be made. This allows the mediator to create a flexible agenda plan that accounts
for contingencies without having to constantly recalculate the agenda during the
negotiation process between the agents. Although dynamic agendas allow a greater
level of control and accuracy for guiding agents back to desirable areas of the
solution space, agenda trees provide a similar functionality statically. One thing
to keep mind, however, is that a lot of work goes into generating an agenda tree
since each agenda featured in the tree has to have its stages’ utility spaces divided
up and choose an agenda for each division. Figure 7.14 is a bit deceptive because
it makes it look like a single agenda’s utility space is divided for creating the tree,






























Figure 7.14: Example of agenda trees. The mediator chooses an initial agenda, in
this case agenda A1, and creates an agenda tree as shown on the right; the utility
space of the first two stages of agenda A1 are also shown. These spaces are divided
up into the sections 1 through 6, and for each section an agenda is assigned to it. In
the first stage, agents negotiate the new current agreement, depending on where this
agreement lies in the utility space will determine which agenda will be used in stage 2.
If the agreement is in section 1, then the tree tells us that agenda A2 will be used in
stage 2. Similarly, agreements in sections 2 and 3 will result in using agendas A1 and
A3 in stage 2, respectively. As the agenda tree shows, if the agents keep their solutions
in the centre sections (sections 2 and 5), which is likely where the mediator is trying to
guide the agents, then the agenda tree will stay with the original agenda A1. If agents




In the BAM framework we brought together many different concepts, techniques,
and tools, in order to approach a problem from many different angles but integrated
into one endeavour. Many of these ideas and artifacts were taken from different
contexts and settings, but have been utilised in new ways as they got woven into our
system; some are familiar stalwarts still very useful in complimenting our system.
Some highlights of the methods and ideas we used are:
• Single Negotiating Texts (SNTs) were used as a way to focus agents on a
single agreement to incrementally improve and move through the solution
space.
• Agendas have been geometrically re-imagined as a tool for guiding agents
along desirable negotiation pathways.
• With SNTs and agendas combined, we have conceived ways of constraining
the solution space, creating a potent tool for illuminating profitable solution
subspaces for the agents to explore.
• The increasing-pie model of John and Raith [11] is embedded in renegotiating
agendas that achieve a balance of flexibility and simplicity, while still allowing
efficient agreements to emerge.
• Game-theoretic principles have been incorporated in our arbitration module
mechanisms to create initial agreements with provable properties.
All of these ideas have been brought together under one umbrella tasked with
facilitating a positive negotiation environment for the agents, being a mediator that
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guides them to jointly beneficial agreements. The instantiation of the BAM frame-
work developed in this thesis introduced an interesting new way to combine these
ideas and tools into a working mediator that helps guide agents in an environment
of uncertainty created by an incomplete information setting.
The assumption that all agents are rational is not realistic and undesirable in a
framework that deals with very general situations, which is why the BAM frame-
work did not assume that agents have a particular level of sophistication. However,
the framework does keep in mind that agents are an incredible asset, being the only
stakeholders in the negotiation that (collectively) know the true global information
state. The framework expanded Bartal et al.’s [2] multilateral market mechanism
idea of having agents finalise the agreement to a broader way of approaching bi-
lateral negotiations. This opens up a whole new avenue for bilateral negotiation
research where agents are key actors in finalising the third-party aspirations of
the researchers. This is not necessarily an easy research methodology, but neither
are incomplete information negotiations easy to “solve”. We have already seen a
number of possible advancements of our particular system in the previous chapter,
however it would be very interesting to see the various ideas the research community
could explore within the general BAM framework, which embodies the relatively




The Number Of Agendas
In Section 5.4.3, it was mentioned that an agenda is chosen by examining every
possible agenda. Naturally, one might wonder how much work this entails when
the näıve number of agendas to consider is n!. This factorial number of agendas,
however, is based on using a stage size of one issue for every stage. If we consider
a fixed stage size of z, let f = bn
z
c and F = dn
z
e (F is the number of stages in the
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choices for the last stage. Although this value will always equal 1
because n− fz ≤ z.
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(z!)f (n− fz)! (A.2)
Thus we have
n!
(z!)f (n− fz)! agendas, which can be a significant improvement
over the näıve n! agendas, due to the savings factor, (z!)f (n−fz)!. Table A.1 gives
a comparison for the total number of agendas per stage size when we have 10 issues,
and Figure A.1 shows the same results graphically. It is easier to see in the graph
(Figure A.1) that as we exceed half the number of issues per stage, the decrease in
the number of agendas is reduced.
z = issues per stage
n!











Table A.1: The number of possible agendas when we have 10 issues and varying


















Figure A.1: The number of agendas for a negotiation of 10 issues with varying stage
sizes. This is the graphical result of Table A.1. Note that the y-axis is logarithmic and
thus this graph shows an exponential decline in the number of agendas with increasing
stage size. After 5 issues per stage, the rate of decrease declines because f = 1 in
(z!)f (n− fz)! since the stage size is now more than half the number of issues, thus we
lose that exponential factor in (z!)f . However, there is still a fairly steady decline as
stage size increases.
A.1 Amount of Computation
We have determined how many agendas we actually have to look at when choosing
an agenda, but how much computation do we need to perform on each agenda?
With the relatively simple quality measure we defined in Definition 12(Section
5.4.3), the actual computation per agenda is quadratic in the number of issues,
but consists of very simple constant time calculations. It is quadratic because
performing the necessary line intersections for determining the desired and expected
solutions for each stage requires looking at each edge in each stage’s efficient frontier.
Since the number of edges in a frontier is the same as the number of issues in the
stage, we have an approximately linear calculation over an approximately linear
number of stages. This is really overestimating quite a bit especially as the stage
sizes increase (and thus there are fewer stages), but quadratic is the upper bound
on the work we perform for a single agenda.
However, the point we really want to make is that even despite being quadratic
and having a potentially large number of agendas, the computation for a realistic
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number of issues, anywhere from 4 to 20, is still easily computable time-wise1 As
we get into large numbers of issues, say 30, things can become a little unwieldy if
we do not perform any reductions to make the computation for choosing an agenda
simpler. The intent of this system is not necessarily to be a real-time mediator, thus
larger numbers of issues are still not that much of a problem as computations can
be performed offline. However, it is always nice to find more efficient algorithms.
A.2 Computational Reductions
The computational reductions we are going to achieve come about from how agen-
das are constructed and evaluated. We show that there are a lot of overlapping
subproblems in creating agendas because many efficient frontiers appear in several
agendas and the calculations performed on such frontiers need only be done once
per frontier. In addition to overlapping subproblems, it is the case that we evaluate
an agenda by breaking it down into its individual stages and evaluating each stage
and then summing the results to determine the overall evaluation of the agenda.
What we are alluding to here is that when considering many agendas that have
overlaps in their stages, we are able to take advantage of an optimal substructure
property. Together, these two properties allow us to take advantage of dynamic
programming to achieve significant savings in choosing the best agenda to use in
our negotiations.
A.2.1 Preliminary Discussion
Consider counting the number of agendas as the leaf nodes of a tree being built
from a root of no issues, while each branch represents adding a new stage of issues
to the agenda. We end up with a tree like in Figure A.2 where the branching factor
at each level follows the terms in Equation A.1. In this tree, each node represents
a partial agenda composed of d · z issues where d is the depth of the node.
Evaluating each agenda involves assessing the quality at each stage of the
agenda. The quality measure is made for a stage by looking at its efficient frontier
and calculating the desired solution and the expected solution.2 It is important to
1Less than a second on a 1.8 GHz first-generation dual-core processor with 2GB of RAM.
2In order to calculate the desired solutions, we do have to determine the final negotiation
frontier and determine the global Nash Bargaining Solution. However, this frontier and NBS
solution are the same for all possible agendas, so this only needs to be done once. To calculate the
expected solutions requires the initial agreement, which also remains constant for all the agendas.
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Figure A.2: The tree shows how we build the agendas by adding stages as our branches
and the agendas are the leaf nodes. The tree uses n issues and a stage size of z.
realise that if two agendas have a stage with the same efficient frontier in the utility
space, all the calculations are the same for both of these stages, which means we
should really only do them once and store them.
Now let us consider a small example of four issues I = {a, b, x, y} with a stage
size of 2 issues, meaning we have 6 possible agendas.3 If we paid no attention to
overlapping subproblems (meaning stages that have the same frontier) within the
agendas we would have a tree as in Figure A.3 which is an instantiation of the tree
in Figure A.2. Whereas if we did observe the overlap we would have something like
that shown in Figure A.4.
In the latter figure (Figure A.4), at stage 0, we have no issues in our agenda. At
stage 1 we have six partial agendas consisting of the issues ab, ax, ay, bx, by, and xy.
At stage 2, we will actually have included all the issues in the negotiation (remember
that our negotiation process allows negotiation on all issues in the current stage
and all issues in previous stages, as discussed in Section 2.4.3). Every one of the
3 4!
(2!)2(4− 2 · 2)! = 6
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ab ax ay bx by xy
ab ax ay bx by xy
abxy abxy abxy abxy abxy abxy
xy by bx ay ax ab
Ø
Figure A.3: A small example of an agenda that does not combine overlapping nodes.
partial agendas from stage 1 will branch to the one single agenda that includes
all the issues, abxy. Of course, this makes sense because at stage 2 every agenda
includes all issues and thus the efficient frontier is the same at this stage for every
possible agenda. What this means is that at stage 2, we really only need to perform
one set of calculations instead of six.
Although the example just mentioned is very small it illustrates how overlapping
subproblems can occur: when nodes at the same depth of the tree actually contain
the same issues, the nodes can be combined into one node (this is seen in Figure
A.3, where the six abxy nodes have been collapsed into the single abxy node in
Figure A.4). If this is kept in mind, then it is easy to see that there are lots of
overlapping subproblems.






are that many ways to choose z issues from n issues. At the second stage, the naive
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ab ax ay bx by xy
abxy
xy by bx ay ax ab
bx by xy
Figure A.4: The same example from Figure A.3 but combining the final nodes into one
node since every agenda uses it.
The only difference in these two equations are the terms (s!)2 and (2s)!.
(s!)2 = (1 · 2 · · · (s− 1) · s)(1 · 2 · · · (s− 1) · s)
(2s)! = (1 · 2 · · · (s− 1) · s)((s + 1) · (s + 2) · · · (2s− 1) · 2s)
(1 · 2 · · · (s− 1) · s) < ((s + 1) · (s + 2) · · · (2s− 1) · 2s)














This result is easily generalisable to other stages deeper in the graph. At a
depth of d > 0 in the graph, the number of nodes is n!
(s!)d(n−ds)! , but the maximum






(ds)!(n−ds)! , and (s!)
d < (ds)!. There is potentially a lot
of overlap, and the tree in Figure A.2, with nodes combined to account for overlap,
actually becomes the graph in Figure A.5.
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Figure A.5: Graph showing the minimum number of nodes(or efficient frontiers) that
need to be evaluated in order to examine all possible agendas using a stage size of z
on a negotiation of n issues. We can see that compared to the expanding tree shape
in Figure A.2 there are a lot of overlapping nodes which results in a diamond shape to
the graph.
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a significant savings of computation as illustrated in Table A.2 where we recreate
Table A.1 but add in the number of nodes needed when we collapse common nodes
and when we do not.
z # agendas # nodes # nodes









1 3628800 36288002 1024
2 113400 567002 512
3 16800 50402 342
4 3150 6302 257
5 252 506 254
6 210 212 212
7 120 122 122
8 45 47 47
9 10 12 12
Table A.2: Showing the difference between collapsing common nodes in our agenda
counting graphs and not collapsing them (“with overlap” and “without overlap”, re-
spectively). Up until stage sizes of one half the number of issues we see a savings in
nodes. Note that f = bn
z
c, and also we have added two nodes to each entry to account
for the root node and the bottom node that represents the final frontier for all issues.
A.2.2 Dynamic Programming
Our algorithm for choosing the best agenda according to the quality measure used
is simply a depth-first traversal of the graph in Figure A.5, where at each node we
do the following:
1. Calculate the efficient frontier line segments for the current node. This is
usually based off of the frontier that is provided by the parent node, which
would then just require adding a few new issues to that existing frontier.
2. Calculate the desired solution from the current frontier and the solution line
(the solution line is calculated before the traversal of the graph).
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3. Calculate the expected solution from the current frontier and initial agree-
ment.
4. Calculate the quality measure from the expected and desired solutions and
record its as this node’s quality value.
5. Recursively call the depth first node-evaluation traversal on all possible child
nodes.
6. Create a reference to the child node that had the best quality measure and
add that quality value to our current node’s quality value (this step here is
where we store results for later memoization).
7. Return the current node’s quality value to the parent node.
In doing this traversal, each time we evaluate a node, we record its quality value
(which is the best quality value from this stage and onward that can be achieved by
using this node) and a link to the node at the next stage that will lead to the best
possible agenda from this node. When the traversal encounters a node (frontier)
more than once, this recorded quality value can be used instead of evaluating the
node again; this is why the savings in Table A.2 are achieved.
At the end of this traversal, the graph in Figure A.5 becomes a DAG (directed
acyclic graph) as in Figure A.6. Determining the best agenda is then just a matter
of traversing the DAG from the root to the node at the bottom.
Since our quality measure (see Definition 12) is a minimising measure, we are
essentially just performing a shortest path dynamic programming algorithm for our
graph.
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Figure A.6: Directed acyclic graph (DAG) that is the result of performing our node-
evaluation traversal on a graph like in Figure A.5. The directed edges indicate the
node/frontier to use in the next stage to achieve the best quality agenda from that
point onward. Some nodes in the graph will not have incoming edges to them, but all
nodes will have one outgoing edge to the next stage nodes.
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